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This paper has its origins in the efforts of various mathematicians to systemati- 
cally constructivize large portions of mathematics. A natural question is, "What 
more do we know when we have solved a problem constructively, than when we 
have solved it using proof by contradiction?" There are several known answers to 
this question, ranging from the philosophical to the recursion-theoretic, but all the 
answers eem to involve constructivity or computability in some sense. Here we 
offer a different answer: if a problem has been solved constructively, then the 
solution depends continuously on all parameters of the problem. In short: 
constructive xistence implies continuous dependence. This heuristic principle 
promises to be of some usefulness in organizing, understanding, and extending the 
known results on continuous dependence in analysis, e.g. that the solutions of 
certain differential equations depend continuously on the initial or boundary 
conditions. 
Our purpose in the present paper is to make a metamathematical study based on 
the above idea. We present wo types of results: 
(i) if a problem can be proved to have a solution in certain formal systems, then 
the solution depends continuously on the parameters, and in fact it can be proved in 
the system that the solution depends continuously on the parameters; in short, 
derived rules of inference related to continuity. 
(ii) consistency and independence r sults: it is consistent with certain formal 
systems to assume that if a problem can be solved, then the solution depends 
continuously on parameters. 
These questions, which arose by consideration of the practice of mathematics, 
are nevertheless closely connected to many interesting questions at the foundations 
of constructive mathematics: questions involving the relations between continuity 
and extensionality of functions, and between the quantifier combination Va 
X =lb E Y and the means by which b can be produced from a. Our genera/results 
seem to give us the ideal tool for investigating (the formal analogues) of these 
questions. 
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In another paper, we apply the specific metamathematical results of this paper to 
some concrete mathematical questions arising in geometry; for instance, if surfaces 
x, converge to x, under what conditions can we say that the area A (x,) converges 
to A (x)? If we can show that the area functional is well-defined on a certain space 
of surfaces, then the problem of finding a real number equal to A (x) can be solved; 
so the solution will depend continuously on the parameter x. Some other examples 
are discussed below, and in [4]. 
We now intend to describe our results more precisely. As the example just given 
illustrates, one important special case of our general principle is that if a function 
can be constructively proved to be well-defined, then it must be continuous. Some 
care is called for here, as there are obviously discontinuous functions on the 
rationals. The correct statement is that if f is a provably well-defined function from 
a complete separable metric space X to a separable metric space Y, then f is 
provably continuous. In order to give a more complete list of our theorems, let X 
be a (provably) complete separable metric space, and Y be (provably) a separable 
metric space. Let C(X, Y) be the space of functions from X to Y which are 
uniformly continuous on compact subsets. By "function" we mean a well-defined 
(extensional) operation. We now give a list of important corollaries to our main 
results (the numbers refer to section numbers in the paper): 
Section 2.4 (Rule of continuous choice). If '#a E X 3!b ~ YP(a, b) is provable, 
then so is 3f  E C(X, Y)Va ~ XP(a,f(a)). 
Section 2.6 (Principle of continuity). If f can be proved to be a function from X 
to Y, then f can be proved to be in C(X, Y). 
Section 2.5 (Heine-Borel 's  rule). If a sequence of neighborhoods _1", can be 
proved to cover a compact space, then for some k, the union of the first k 
neighborhoods can be proved to cover the space. 
Section 3.3. It is consistent o assume that all functions from X to Y are 
uniformly continuous on compact subsets. 
Section 3.1. Church's thesis (all functions are recursive) refutes uniform con- 
tinuity, but continuity of all functions from X to Y is consistent with Church's 
thesis. 
Section 3.3. It is consistent o assume ("continuous choice") 
Va ~ X 3!b E YP(a,b )~3f  E C(X, Y)Va E XP(a,f(a)). 
Section 3.4. Even with the aid of Church's thesis, the principle "all functions 
from X to Y are continuous" remains underivable. 
The above results flow from a more general formulation of the idea expressed 
informally at the first of the introduction. We call this formulation the "Principle of 
local continuity"; it is a principle of continuous choice which seems to be 
formulated here for the first time. It arose by consideration of the following 
problem: Suppose, for real x and integers m, we can constructively prove Vx3m 
A (x, m). What can we say about the means of producing rn from x? Continuity is 
too much to ask, as the examples 
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A(x ,m) :  (m=0&x<l )  (m=l&x>0) ,  
B(x,m):  m >-x, 
show. However, the examples uggest he possibility that, given x, we may be able 
to find m continuously on some neighborhood of x. This turns out to be a very 
fruitful idea. It leads immediately to the formulation of the following principle (LC 
for "local continuity"): Let X be a (formula defining a) complete separable metric 
space and let P be an (extensional) property; this can all be expressed by a formula 
H. Then 
LC(X, N): Va E X ~m ~ NP(a,m) & H 
~ Va ~ X 3nbhdN(a) ~m Vz ~ N(a)  P(z, m ). 
More generally, if Y is a separable metric space, and as before X is a complete 
separable metric space, we can formulate principles of local continuity concerning a 
problem P(a, b) with parameters a from X and solution b in Y. Let us call a 
solution b "stable for a" if 
Ve>038 >0VcEN~(a)3d~N, (b)P (c ,d ) .  
(Here N~(a) is the neighborhood of a with radius 8.) Then the most natural 
principle of local continuity might be 
SLC§ H&VaEX3b~YP(a ,b )  
-~VaEX3bE Y(P(a ,b)&b i ss tabtefora) .  
That is, if we can constructively prove that P(a, b) always has a solution, then it 
always has a solution which is stable under perturbations of the parameters. 
We cannot prove anything about SLC+(X, Y) without further restrictions on Y 
and P, which however are always satisfied in applications, it seems. Namely, Y must 
be complete, and for each a, the set {b E Y : P(a, b)} must be closed as a subset of 
Y. The resulting principle is 
LC*(X,Y) :  H&Va~X3bE YP(a ,b )&VaEX{b~Y:P(a ,b )}  is closed 
- - -~VaEX3b~ Y(P(a ,b)&b stablefora) .  
Note that if Y is the integers N, the extra condition is always satisfied, so that 
LC+(X, N) reduces to LC (X, N). 
We also consider the derived rules of inference corresponding to LC(X, N) and 
LC + (X, Y), in which the second line is to be inferred from the first. We write these 
rules as LCR(X,N) and LCR+(X, Y). Our main results on the principle of local 
continuity are 
Section 2.1. The systems we consider are closed under the derived rules 
LCR*(X, Y), and under a weaker variant LCR(X, Y), which does not, however, 
require restrictions to complete Y and closed P. 
Section 3.2. It is consistent to assume LC+(X, Y). 
252 M.Z Beeson 
Section 2.7. Like uniform continuity, LC § (X, Y) contradicts Church's thesis. 
We also consider a "principle of local uniform continuity" in which, for example, 
a lower bound is required on the diameter of the neighborhoods N(a) in the 
principle LC (X,N); corresponding results are proved for this principle, including 
derived rules and consistency. A related result is the consistency of Heine-Borel 's 
theorem with the principles of local continuity. 
So far, we have not said anything about the question of which formal systems we 
work with. A little history is in order here. A milepost in the progress of (informal) 
constructive mathematics was the publication of Bishop's book [8] in 1967. Since 
that time, several ogicians have turned their attention to the problem of finding 
suitable formal systems to describe the work of the new constructivists. It has 
turned out that there are (at least) two viable approaches to this problem. Feferman 
has presented one type of formal system, and Friedman and Myhill a quite different 
type of system. It is not my purpose to discuss the relative merits of these systems. 
The results on local continuity contained in this paper apply to systems of both 
types. If further systems are developed, in all likelihood these results will apply to 
the new systems also. In order to make this clear, we have derived all our theorems 
on continuity from three basic metamathematical properties of the formal systems 
S at hand; these properties are, roughly speaking, 
(i) formalized explicit definability theorems: If Tt -3nP(n) ,  then for some 
numeral ti, TI-P(fi); and this can be proved in S for subsystems T of bounded 
complexity. 
(ii) Reflection principles: S ~-Prv('A ')---~ A for subsystems T of bounded com- 
plexity. 
(iii) Uniform continuity of functions provably defined on 2 N. 
(Exact statements of the conditions are in Section 2.) It is worth noting that (iii), 
which is more recondite than (i) and (ii), is needed only for results on uniform 
continuity. It is also worth noting that, if we only require that the conclusion of the 
rules be true, without worrying whether it is formally provable, then (ii) and the 
formalized part of (i) are unnecessary. Thus the validity of the general principle, "if 
a problem can be constructively proved to have a solution in a theory S, then the 
solution depends continuously on parameters", depends only on a rather weak 
metamathematical property of explicit definability. 
Sections 2 and 3 of this paper give the derivations of our results on continuity 
from these conditions; section 2 deals with derived rules, and section 3 with 
consistency and independence results. In section 1, we describe Feferman's 
systems, and do thenecessary metamathematics to verify the conditions (i), (ii), and 
(iii). In another paper [6] we verify that Friedman and Myhill's systems also satisfy 
these conditions. The verifications have certain features in common, but it is not 
possible to give a simultaneous treatment. Here are a few words about the 
metamathematical methods we need: in order to establish explicit numerical 
definability results, we use a variant of realizability. We have to take some care to 
get the formalized version needed to establish (i). In the case of Feferman's 
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theories, the realizing objects are only terms of the theory, not numbers; so in order 
to get numerical explicit definability, we also need an analysis of computable t rms. 
Condition (ii) is more or less standard. In order to get condition (iii), we introduce a
variant of forcing. Thus conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are verified, so the derived rules 
related to continuity hold for Feferman's ystems. The consistency and indepen- 
dence results are established by realizability in certain models. The heart of these 
proofs is the construction of a system of partial functions (applying to each other) in 
which continuity holds in a certain sense. 
The consistency results, like the results on derived rules, have a strongly 
"system-independent" character. One can say, informally, that they should apply to 
any system admitting a realizability interpretation. With similar informality, one 
can say that the derived rules should hold if the system admits realizability, forcing, 
and reflection principles. (Then (i), (ii), and (iii) will hold.) 
The idea of the proof of closure under the rule of local continuity can be given as 
follows. First, reduce to the case LC(X,N). Now, suppose Va ~ X3nP(a,n) is 
provable. Fix b in X. Then 3riP(b, n) is probable. So for some n, P(b, h) is 
provable. This proof has only finitely many steps, so only finitely many values of b 
can be used. (For simplicity imagine X is NN.) Hence for all a which agree with b on 
these finitely many values, we have P(a, n); but this is the conclusion we were 
trying to reach. Of course, there are some gaps in this sketch; the precise proof is in 
section 2. 
In this paper, the principle of local continuity is considered metamathematically, 
both for its own sake and as a tool by means of which some more customary 
metamathematical theorems can be conveniently analyzed. We have already 
alluded to the mathematical uses of the principle, a point to which we now return. It 
often happens that for some mathematically interesting problem P(a,b), the 
hypothesis of the principle of local continuity is constructively provable. The 
application of our derived rules then yields immediately a stronger esult, the 
existence for each a in X of a "stable" solution b. For example, in our paper [4], we 
have used this idea to give a new proof of the theorem of Morse and Tompkins [24] 
that the infimum of the areas of surfaces bounded by a Jordan curve depends 
continuously on the Jordan curve. Here P(a, b) says that a is a Jordan curve and b 
is the infimum of areas of surfaces bounded by a. To give another example, suppose 
that P(a,b) says that b is a solution of a certain differential equation with 
parameters (e.g. boundary conditions) a. Then, if we can constructively prove the 
existence of a solution, e.g. by successive approximations, we automatically 
conclude the continuous dependence of the solution on the parameters. Another 
illustration is the continuous dependence ofeigenvalues of the vibrating-membrane 
equation on the domain. Still another application might arise by taking P(a, b) to 
say that b is a minimal surface spanning the Jordan curve a. Then the hypothesis of 
LC(X, Y) is (a version of) the problem of Plateau. The conclusion of the rule asserts 
the existence of an "elastic" minimal surface, i.e. one stable under perturbation of 
its boundary. (A version of this theorem is already known m it is due to Hilde- 
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brandt and was recently generalized by Tomi [28].) The examples given should 
suffice to illustrate the range of applicability of the principle of local continuity. 
Although one may expect hat results obtained in this way would, in each special 
case, be directly provable by extensions of the ideas involved in the constructive 
existence proof, the role of the metamathematical principle is to unify the different 
situations, systematize the process of deriving continuous dependence from the 
constructive xistence proof, and suggest new theorems. It is satisfying to see 
formally the connection between constructive xistence proofs and continuous 
dependence, which was intuitively understood since Hadamard formulated his 
famous criteria for a "well-posed problem" in differential equations [10, p. 273]. 
We take this opportunity to thank Professor Feferman for his interest and 
continuing support; Professor Friedman for first interesting us in these questions, 
several years ago, and for valuable conversations on the subject; Professor 
Greenleaf for listening patiently and asking the right questions; Professor Kreisel 
for his lessons in organizing a mathematical paper, and Professors Scott and 
Troelstra for their observations which helped to improve the earlier drafts, and 
Troelstra especially for his help with the historical appendix. 
0. FEFERMAN'S SYSTEMS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE MATHEMATICS 
In this section we describe Feferman's formal systems for "explicit mathematics" 
[11]. We have made a few changes in Feferman's original systems, which we discuss 
below. These systems are interesting and useful primarily because they satisfy the 
two criteria mentioned in the introduction, of being close both to constructive 
mathematical practice and to foundational concepts. We describe two systems: EM 
(for "explicit mathematics") and EMN, which is EM without its strong axioms of 
transfinite induction (but with induction on the integers N). We shall also discuss 
carefully the treatment of metric spaces in EMN, and finally discuss the axiom of 
choice and some other schemata. 
0.1. Description of EM and EMN 
The variables of EM are intended to range over the constructive universe, which 
contains at least wo kinds of objects: operations and classifications. The operations 
are thought of as "rules" which may apply to other objects in the universe. Thus we 
include a predicate App (f, x, y) whose intended interpretations is, f is an operation 
and f(x) is defined and has value y. (The notion of classification will be explained 
shortly.) We write f(x)-~ y to abbreviate App(f,x, y), and f(x)$ (read "f(x)  is 
defined") to abbreviate 3y App(f, x, y). EM includes the axiom f(x)-~ u &f(x) 
v--~ u = v. EM contains several constants and axioms to guarantee that the 
operations have reasonable closure properties: 
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(i) a pairing function p and unpairing functions Pt and pz 
(ii) combinators k and s with axioms 
kxy =x;  sxy ~ &sxyz =xz(yz) .  
Sometimes we write (x, y ) for pxy. 
From this much, we can define the natural numbers, N, by regarding (x, 0} as the 
successor of x (and including the axiom that 0 is not a pair). We shall see below how 
to make this definition within EM; we then can include a constant for definition-by- 
cases, with an axiom 
dabxy = a i f x=y,  
=b i fx#y,  forx,  y inN. 
We can then obtain the existence of a "universal" operation U such that Uxy ~ xy, 
and derive the recursion theorem as is usually done in combinatorial logic. (Details 
are in [11].) That is, the operations form an "enumerative system" as defined in 
[13], except hat definition by cases is somewhat restricted. (See also Section 1.2 
below.) Since the recursion theorem can be used to show closure under primitive 
recursion and the least-number operator, these operations are available in EM. 
Some of the objects in the universe are thought of as sets, or better: classifica- 
tions. In informal constrt/ctive mathematics, we define, for instance, the reals as a 
set of sequences of rationaIs satisfying a certain property; in order to make this 
definition, we have already defined the rationals Q and the set of sequences QN. 
Feferman includes in EM a unary predicate CI (x), whose intended interpretation is 
"x is a classification", and a binary relation x ~ y, whose interpretation is that "x 
falls under the classification y ". (There are philosophical distinctions between "set" 
and "classification" which led Feferman to use ~ instead of @, but here we use ~.  
Perhaps the most important formal difference is that we do not have extensionality 
for classifications; like operations, two classifications are equal if and only if they 
are (definitionally or intensionally) identical. There is further discussion of this idea 
below.) 
Feferman then gives several axiom schemata for generating classifications. These 
are, comprehension, join, and induction. (Induction belongs to EM, but only a 
limited form of induction belongs to EMN.) Comprehension says that {x: 0(x)} 
exists, where 0 is a certain type of formula. Clearly we will have a Russell paradox if 
we allow all formulae 0; a careful analysis is called for to discover which O may be 
legitimately allowed. According to the informal constructive concept of classifica- 
tion which we are trying to axiomatize, we have defined a classification X when we 
have told what it means for p to be a proof of y E X. (Here "proof" refers to 
informal constructive proof.) If X is {y : 0(y)}, then p is a proof of y E X if and only 
if p is a proof of 0(y). This is defined as usual in terms of operations and the concept 
"q is a proof of A"  for various subformulae A of 0, and will be defined provided 
we know what "q is a proof of A"  means for the atomic subformulae of 0. This will 
be true so long as all atomic subformulae of the form x ~ Z occurring in 0 have Z a 
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previously-defined classification. If Z were a bound variable of 0, then X itself 
would be in the range of Z, and our definition would be plunged into infinite 
regress. We therefore require that 0 in the comprehension axiom be "elementary", 
which means that it does not contain the symbol CI at all (except as needed to 
restrict certain free variables, other than x, to range over classifications). Of course, 
0 can contain terms which name specific classifications, uch as Q or QN in our 
example above. In fact, in order to use the comprehension schema to define a set 
like {x: x ~ QN&0(x)}, we will have to include terms to denote sets already defined. 
We therefore include for each n a constant c, ; if n = '0', we write c0 for c.0.. We 
intend c~(yl . . . .  ,y,)  to stand for {x:O(X, yl . . . .  ,y,)}. (Generally f(yl  . . . .  ,y , )  ab- 
breviates fYx... Y,, as in combinatory logic; in particular for f = co.) The precise 
version of the comprehension axiom will be given below in a complete list of all the 
axioms of EM. 
The second method of generating classifications i "join". Suppose we have an 
operation F and classification A such that for all x ~-A, f (x)  is a classification. 
Then we form a new classification B, such that 
(x ,y )~B iff yEf (x )&xEA.  
We add a new constant j and an axiom asserting that j(A, f)  is this classification B. 
The system EMN consists, roughly, of the foregoing axioms, plus a constant N for 
the integers and the axioms 
0~ N&Vx (x E N--~ x'  E N), 
O(0)&Vx e N(O(x)~ O(x'))--, Vz e NO(z). 
Let us consider to what extent he system so far described suffices to formalize 
constructive mathematical practice. It is quite clear that Bishop's book can be 
formalized in this system, except for the theory of Borel sets which requires 
transfinite induction. But consider the following: When one wishes to define, for 
instance, the space C([O, 1]) of uniformly continuous real-valued functions on [0, 1], 
one has a choice of two possible definitions: (with I = [0, 1]) 
(i) C(I) = {f E R~: 3w MOD (f, w)}, where MOD (f, w) expresses that w is a 
modulus of uniform continuity for f. 
(ii) C( I )= {f E R ' :  V e 3 8Vx, y @ I( Ix - y J8--* I f (x ) - f (y ) l<  s)}, where e and 
range over positive rationals. 
To prove the equivalence of these two definitions would require some form of the 
axiom of choice, which we have not included. Furthermore, neither definition is in 
the spirit of Bishop, who would prefer that each element of C(I) come already 
equipped with a modulus of continuity. That is, an element of C(I) should be a pair 
(f, w ) with f ~ R x and MOD (f, w). The unpairing function pt can be used to get at f 
itself. 
Remarkably enough, it is possible to find a formal system which forces us to 
make the "right" constructive definitions (in the absence of the axiom of choice); 
that is, forces us to carry along all the information eeded to construct elements of 
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the sets in question. The trick is to restrict the formula 0 in the comprehension 
axiom to have only harmless occurrences of the existential quantifiers, i.e., those 
which can be explicitly fulfilled. We give the exact formulation in the precise list of 
axioms below. 
A useful concept in connection with EM and EMN is "application term". This is 
defined as follows: any variable or constant is an application term; if t and s are 
application terms, so is t(s). These terms are not part of the official syntax, but we 
make systematic use of them via the abbreviations given below. 
This completes our informal description of the system EMN which we consider 
basic. For reference, we shall now collect in one place a precise list of the 
abbreviations connected with application terms, the definition of elementary 
formula, and the list of axioms of EMN and EM. 
Abbreviations 
t ~ y for t = y, when t is a variable or constant, 
t s~y for 9x3z( t~x&s- - - z&App(x ,z ,y ) ) ,  
(t $) for 3y(t ~- y), 
t-.=-s for Vy( t -~y,~,s=y) ,  
0(t,.. .) for 3y(t  ~y)&Vy( t  -y  ~--~ 0(y . . . .  )), 
t~t2.., t, for (...(ttt2)...)t,,. 
Definition of elementary formula : fl is elementary if 
(i) 0 does not mention C1 except to restrict the range of some of its free 
variables to CI. If 0 contains such uses of CI, the variables o restricted will be 
written with capital letters, e.g., 0(y, X). We allow y and X to stand for lists of 
variables. 
(ii) If 0 contains an atomic subformula s E t, then t is one of the free variables X
of O. 
(iii) 0 does not contain any constants cB, j, or i. 
(This is an inessential restriction, because we can form {x!O(y, W)} and then 
substitute a constant c for y.) 
Axioms of EMN 
L Basic axioms 
O) App(f ,x,y)&App(f ,x,  w)--* y = w, 
(ii) x ~ y --, c l  (y), 
(iii) kxy -~ x, 
(iv) sxy $ &sxyz ~xz(yz), 
(v) pxy ~, &p~z ~, &pzz ~, &p~(pxy)=x&p2(pxy)~y, 
(vi) ~(pxy  = 0), 
(vii) Vx, y EN((x = y ---~dabxy = a)&(x# y ~dabxy = b)). 
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II. Comprehension 
Let ~(z, y, X) be elementary and have no 3 or v. Here z is a single variable and 
y, X are (possibly empty) lists of variables. Let t be application terms with free 
variables among z, y, )2. Let A (z, y, X) be the formula 0(z, t, X). Then we take as an 
axiom: 
~Z (ca (y ,X)~ Z & Vz (z ~ Z e-~ A (z, y,X))). 
HL Join 
Vx @ A 3X ~x ~ X) - - ,3 J  (j(A,f)-~ J & 
&Vz (z EJ4-~3x, y (z = (x,y)&x EA ay  Efx))). 
IV. Induction 
0 E N&Vx(x ~ N---~ x' E N), 
O(0)&Vx ~ N (0(x)---~ O(x'))--* Vx E N O(x), all formulae ~t. 
Axioms of EM 
The axioms of EM are those of EMN given above; but now the induction axiom 
IV is supplemented by the axiom, 
V. Transfinite induction 
(i) 3I( i (A,R)  = I&Vx E A (Vy ((y,x}~ R ~ y E I))--->x E I)), 
(ii) Vx ~ A (Vy ((y, x) ~ R ~ O(Y))--~ ~(x))--~ 
Vx E i (A,R )fJ(x)), all formulae 0. 
Comparison to Feferman's formulation 
There are several minor points in which our formulation differs from Feferman's. 
The reader who wishes may skip to the next section, omitting these technical points. 
(a) Feferman allows disjunction to appear in the comprehension axiom. We 
think disjunction and existential quantification should be treated similarly. In 
particular, if A and B are two sets, we should not form the union of A but rather of 
the join of A and B, i.e., {(x ,n ) :x~A&n=OvxEB&n=l} .  Then the 
expression z E A U B can be regarded as an abbreviation for, 3 w (z = plw & w E 
A join B). As far as we can see, this makes no difference at all to the formulation of 
mathematical practice (in contrast to allowing or not allowing the existential 
quantifier in the comprehension axiom). It has the advantage of allowing us to use 
the relatively simple versions of realizability. In fact, this was Feferman's main 
reason for restricting the comprehension axiom, but he mistakenly thought he 
could modify the definition of realizability so as to allow v. 
(b) We allow application terms t in the comprehension axiom, which Feferman 
does not. This caused Feferman to have to add several additional constants to the 
language, which we don't need. 
(c) Feferman doesn't include a constant for N; the role of N is played by a certain 
application term, introduced by the axiom of transfinite induction, the axioms IV 
Principles of continuous choice 259 
are then special cases. Namely, N is i(A, R), where A = {x : x = 0 v 3y y' = x } and 
R {(y, x }: x = y'}. But, if disjunction is not allowed in the comprehension axiom, A 
cannot be formed. Of course, once we have the integers and definition by cases, this 
use of disjunction can be eliminated, since it is decidable whether something is zero 
or not. But that doesn't help before N is defined. So we include axioms IV in EM; 
this has the advantage that then EMN is a subsystem of EM literally. 
(d) Decidable equality and explicit definability: Feferman includes the axiom 
x = y v x r y, and a definition by cases function with no restriction to integer cases. 
First let us note that decidable quality for integers can be proved by induction, as 
is well known (first prove x = 0 v x / 0). And decidable quality for integers is the 
only instance of decidable quality ever used in mathematical practice. In fact, the 
very notion of "equality" in the sense of intensional, or definitional, or "identical" 
equality never occurs in mathematical practice. What Bishop speaks of as "equal- 
ity" is simply an equivalence relation accompanying each given set; in other words, 
Bishop's "sets" are classifications equipped with equivalence relatiorts. Neverthe- 
less, if equality is to denote intensional equality, the axiom of decidable quality is 
justified, and so (presumably for this philosophical reason) Feferman incuded it. 
However, from a technical standpoint it introduces erious defects. Principally, 
Feferman's To does not have the disjunction property. That is, Tc~ F A v B does not 
imply To F A or To F B. The reason is simple: T~ F k = 0 v k r 0, but To doesn't prove 
either disjunct. There is nothing special about the constant k; the point is that if one 
adds decidable quality, one should also add enough axioms to settle which terms 
are equal to which terms. (To see that To fails to settle the question whether k = 0, 
one can vary the indexing of partial recursive functions o that 0 is or is not an index 
of a function K such that K(x ,y )= x; then k = 0 can be either true or false in 
Feferman's model (discussed in Section 0.3)). 
It is worth pointing out that the same phenomena re already present in 
arithmetic of finite types. Troelstra considers a theory I -HA ~' which is essentially 
HA"  (arithmetic of finite types) plus decidable quality at all types. In [29, p. 116] it 
is shown that if I-HA'~ F t = s for terms t, s in normal form, then t and s are 
identical. In [29, p. 135] are exhibited non-identical normal terms t and s for which 
I -HA~Yt~ s. Thus I -HA ~ does not have the disjunction property, since I-HA ~' 
proves t = s v t~ s but fails to prove either disjunct. On the other hand, the 
disjunction property is recovered by adding axioms t~ s for all non-identical 
normal terms t and s. The reader will find it instructive to examine various proofs of 
the disjunction property for HA ~ and see why they don't work for I-HA% 
Some additonal systems related to EM and EMN will be described in Section 0.3. 
0.2. Metric spaces in EMN 
Many of our results, as well as theorems of mathematical practice, concern 
separable, complete separable, or compact metric spaces. We therefore discuss the 
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formal treatment of these in EM. It should be noted that the constructive definition 
of metric spaces allows p (x, y) = 0 without x = y ; in case P (x, y) = O, then x and y 
are called extensionally equal. 
Of course, there is no problem expressing in EMN that (X, P) is a complete 
separable metric space; but we want to show that in EMN, each such space is 
isometric to a space in "standard form". When referring to a space (X, p), we often 
leave p implicit, and talk of a metric space X. We say X is in standard form if it is 
formed as follows: We have some operation cr which defi~es a metric on the natural 
numbers (think of N as the countable base of X).  Then X is the set of sequences of 
integers x = {x~}*?=~ such that o-(xi, xj) < 1/i + 1/], and the distance between two such 
sequences i p(x, y)= lim,~| y,). To take care of the discrepancy between N 
starting with 0 and our sequences tarting with subscript 1, we use the convention 
x, = x (n -1 ) .  Note that a space in standard form may or may not be complete. 
Thinking of the rationals as the integers with a certain metric o', we see that 
Bishop's definition of the reals puts R already in standard form. 
Now, if (I", 01) is any complete metric space, it has a countable base y~, y2 , ' " .  
Define o'( i , j )  = pj(y, Y/); then cr is a metric on the positive integers. Let X be the 
space of all sequences of integers such that cr(x,,xj) < 1/i + 1/]. Define p(x, y) = 
lim,_| cr(x,, y,). Then (X, p) is isometric to (Y, px), and this can be proved in EMN; 
and X is in standard form. 
The approaeh to the reals (or what is the same, to complete separable metric 
spaces) via the "standard" sequences above has various advantages and disadvan- 
tages over the approach via Cauchy sequences, and others. Without discussing this 
whole issue, let us summarize the situation by saying that this approach is 
technically simpler, while Cauchy sequences are perhaps pedagogically or concep- 
tually simpler. In any case, one place we have to pay for using this approach is that 
we need the following technical emma: 
Lemma 0.2, Let X be a complete metric space. Given the first k values a l . . . . .  ak of 
some a in X, and some b in X with p (a, b) < 1/k, we can find some c in X with c. = a~ 
for i ~ k, and c extensionally equal to b. Furthermore, this is provable in EMN. 
Proof. Left to reader. 
Notational conventions. In the context of a complete metric space, we use x - y 
for the relation of extensional equality, i.e., 
x -y  lit p (x ,y )=0.  
We use e and 8 only for positive rationals; thus we write VS . . .  for V8 (~5 E 
O&8 >0---~. -. and similarly for 36. 
Consider the space 2 ~, the simplest example of a compact space. It can be put in 
standard form, as above, but that is not its most natural representation. Most 
naturally, 2 N is thought of as the space of sequences of O's and l's. Suppose we have 
a (constructive) sequence of integers Mr . . . . .  M . . . .  ; consider the space of se- 
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quences of integers x = {x~}, such that x,, <~ M. Suppose cr is a metric on all se- 
quence numbers, such that er(t, s) < 1/0h(t)) + 1/(lh(s)). Then X can be made into a 
metric space by defining 0 (x ,y )= lim~r(~(n), y(n)). This is called "standard form 
for compact spaces". For example, 2 N is in standard form for compact spaces with 
M, = 1 and cr(t,s) = 2 -k, where k = least ] : ( t ) j / (s ) j .  We will show that every 
compact space (X, pl) can be made isometric to a space in standard form for 
compact spaces. The important point is that all sequences X with X,  <~ M. are 
used. Recall (e.g. from [8]) that compact means complete and totally bounded, i.e. 
for each e there is a finite e-approximation to X. That is, for each e we can find 
y, . . . . .  Yk such that every point of X is within e of some yk. Now we define for 
certain finite sequence t a member x, of X, as follows: let X~> for k ~< M1 be a 
89 to X ; this determines Mx. If M1 . . . .  , M,_, and x, for lh(t) < n and 
(t)~<<.M~ are determined, then let x,(k~ (k=l ,2  . . . . .  M,)  be a 1] (n+l ) -  
approximation to N~j0,(x,). (This determines M,,) Put o-(t,s) = pl(x,,x~). Define 
p (x ,y )= l im . . . .  o ' (2 (n) ,y (n) ) .  Then p is well-defined since pI(X~,),Y~c, ) ap- 
proaches p~(x, y) as n ~oo; hence also (X, pl) is isometric to the space of all x with 
x, ~< M,, equipped with the metric p. Note that in EMN, a compact space comes 
equipped with an operation which produces from e a finite s-approximation. Note 
also that we can always take M, to be a non-decreasing sequence. 
0.3. Some auxiliary theories 
In this section, we first list some notational conventions, then discuss the theories 
EMN and EM a little more, then give several additional axiom schemata which may 
be considered. We shall also describe some auxiliary theories which are technically 
useful. 
Notation 
is the numeral for  y. 
'A '  is the Godel  number  of A ; or in the context Tr( 'A') ,  'A '  is the numeral for 
the Godel number. 
x may stand for a list of variables x~ . . . . .  x,, with n = 0 a possibility; in this 
context if we have written A (x), then write A (2) or A (t), we mean A (s ~,) or 
A (h . . . .  , t,). Similarly for y, z, and other letters as well as x. 
T is the T-predicate of recursion theory, or in suitable context, a formula 
representing this predicate. U is the result-extracting function, so that {e}(x)= 
U(/~ n Texn) 
(x, y )= p(x, y )= pxy. The same type of brackets is used for some standard 
encoding of sequences of integers, in connection with which we use the notation 
(xo, ...,x._~) and lh (x)= n, (x), = x, 
f ( . )  = ( [ (0 )  . . . . .  f (n  - 1)). 
x'  is px0. 
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EMN is interesting because it provides for a natura] formalization of the 
mathematical practice of the new constructivists, without providing much more. In 
practice, transfinite induction is almost never used. The only instance in Bishop's 
book of an argument not directly (and naturally) formalizable in EMN is Borel sets; 
but this part of the book has been superseded by the Bishop-Cheng notes on 
measure theory [9], in which Borel sets are not used. 
EMN is considerably weaker (proof-theoretically) than EM, we suspect. For 
instance, EMN can be interpreted in AI-CA, while EM appears to require much 
more. It also happens that EMN lends itself to derived rules of the form, if A is 
provable in EMN + classical ogic, then A is provable in EMN, for various A. This 
question, along with others, will be taken up in another paper. 
In the other direction, EM can be strengthened by adding the comprehension 
axiom for all elementary formulae, together with the axiom of choice 
(AC) Vx3yO(x, y)---> 3fVxO(x,f(x)) (all formulae ~). 
While we are considering the axiom of choice, we may as well consider a very 
strong form: 
(ACx) Vx EX3yO(x,y)--*3fVx EX~)(x,f(x)). 
Here X is a classification variable. There is an important difference between AC 
and ACx. 
AC may be considered constructively correct, while no such claim can be made 
for ACx. If one attempts to justify ACx, one reasons as follows: because 
Vx ~ X 3y0(x, y), there should be a method of obtaining y from x. Actually, this 
method produces y from x and a proof that x ~ X. One therefore needs to know 
that every x in X carries its own canonical proof that it is in X, which one doesn't 
know. Thus ACx cannot be claimed to be constructively correct. There is further 
discussion of ACx in Section 1.6. 
There is one case in which ACx can be constructively justified, and that is when 
the term t is N. An integer certainly does carry with it its own proof that it is an 
integer. Let us denote the schema resulting by taking X to be N in AC by ACre. 
Then we denote by EMC the theory obtained from EM by adding the comprehen- 
sion schema for all elementary formulae and the axioms of choice AC and ACN. 
Another version of the axiom of choice which has often been considered is ACvr, 
which is like ACx except hat X is replaced by a closed term denoting a finite type. 
(Here 0 is a type and t' is a type if t and s are types.) Thus ACFr is a schema. 
To any of the theories discussed so far, we could add the following schemata: 
Church's Thesis CTI: 
Vf ~NN3e Vx ~ N3n(Texn& Un = fx); 
Church's Thesis CT2: 
BGVfVx, yEN( f (x )=y ~ 3n(T(G(f) ,x,n)&Un=y)) .  
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CT2 expresses that partial functions from N to N are recursive; CT1 applies only to 
total functions (see Note 1 at the end). 
Markov's Principle: 
(MP) Vm ~N( -nVn EN- -nAnm-->3nENAnm)  A primitive recursive. 
Transfinite induction on recursive well-orderings: 
T I (<)  VyEN(Vx<yAx- ->Ay) -*VzENAz .  
When we write T I (<)  we imply that < is a provably linear primitive recursive 
ordering on N. TI is the schema T I (<)  for all well-orderings -<. 
We now come to the theories which are of technical interest only. These are 
denoted by EMa and EMb. The method of constructing these theories will also 
apply to any of the above theories in place of EM, and produce, e.g. EMNa. We 
first describe EMa. Let X be such that EM proves X is a compact metric space, in 
standard form. Then EMa is formed by adding to EM a constant symbol a and an 
axiom a E X. The dependence on X is left implicit in the notation EMa. Note that 
EMa does not have the disjunction property, since it proves a(0)= 0v a (0) /0  
without proving either disjunct. Nevertheless it is useful. 
The theory EMb is similar to EMa. It is based on a fixed complete separable 
metric space X, but also on some fixed element f of X. (More precisely, f belongs to 
the space denoted by X under the intended interpretation of EM.) EMb is formed 
by adding to EM the constant symbol b, the axiom b E X, and all axioms b(r i )= r~ 
for which f(n)=f(rn).  Thus EMb could reasonably be expected to have the 
disjunction property (and we shall see later that it does). 
1. TECHNICAL TOOLS 
In this section we collect the technical results we will need for the derived rules 
and consistency results in later sections. The reader may wish to skim the rest of the 
paper before delving into this section. The main point of the section is to obtain 
explicit definability results for EM and its variants. This can be done by (variants of) 
realizability; but this yields only the form F 3x Ax implies F A (t), some application 
term t. We also need numerical explicit definability; that is, F 3x E N(A (x)) implies 
I-A (g) for some n. To get this we have to make an analysis of normal [orms for 
application terms. To further complicate matters, we shall require in Section 2 some 
formalized versions of these and other metamathematical results. 
1.1. Feferman's model and realizability for EM 
Familiarity with the usual realizability interpretations for Heyting's arithmetic 
HA (see [29]) will be most helpful (if not absolutely necessary) to the reader. 
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Feferman has given a variant of 1945-realizability for EM; we repeat its definition 
here. We associate to each formula 0 of EM a formula fr 0, whose free variables are 
those of 0 together with f ;  fr  0 is read " f  realizes 0". The clauses giving fr 0 are as 
follows: 
for 0 atomic, f r  0 is (f = f)&O, 
fr (A &B)  is p, f rA  &pff rB,  
fr (A v B)  is (p, f  = 0----> p~frA)&(p l f~  O--->pzfrB), 
fr (A -9 B)  is Vg(grA ---> fgrB), 
f rVxA is Vx(fxrA) ,  
fr 3xA is 3x (f = p(p,f, x)&p l f rA) .  
Feferman proves that this realizability is sound for his version T~ of EM in the 
sense that if TO I-A then To }- t rA for some application term t. We remark that this 
result extends to EM as we have formulated it (with a slightly broader comprehen- 
sion axiom). 
Note. In [11], there is a mistake in the definition of f rA  v B ; the correct version 
is given here. 
Feferman also gives a model A/ for EM plus classical logic plus the full 
comprehension schema CA (for all elementary formulae). In this model, the 
operations are interpreted as numbers and App(e, x, y) is interpreted as {e} (x) = y, 
where as usual {e} is the recursive function with index e. The e-relation and 
predicate C1 of og are defined inductively, following the axioms of EM. Thus N of 
the mode/ will be some subset of the integers, recursively isomorphic to the 
integers. The result of this is that EM is consistent, in fact consistent with Church's 
Thesis CT2. 
The construction of the model d//, as Feferman points out, can be viewed as a 
translation of EM + CA into second-order analysis: App (e, x, y) is translated into 
3n(Texn&Un = y), and C1 and e are translated into formulae defining the 
corresponding relations in ~r We shall need to know that EM + CA can be 
translated not only into classicaI analysis, but into the corresponding intuitionistic 
"theory of species" HAS (for "Heyting's arithmetic with species"). See [29] for a 
precise description of HAS; informally, HAS consists of numerical variables, set or 
species variables, induction for all formulae, and the full second-order comprehen- 
sion axiom. The observation that the e -relation and C1 predicate of ~ are given by 
inductive definitions which can be carried out in HAS, and the axioms of join, 
comprehension, and induction verified, is summarized in the following lemma: 
Lemma 1.1. There is a translation of EM + CA + CT: into HAS, such that if the 
translation of A is A *, then EM + CA + CT2 F- A implies HAS ~- A *. Furthermore, 
for arithmetic A, A and A * are equivalent; that is, irA is the natural translation of 
an arithmetic formula P into EM, then HAS t- A * ~-> P. 
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The last observation of the lemma reflects the fact that the integers of ~ are 
recursively isomorphic to the integers. 
As Feferman points out, there are interesting questions concerning the relation- 
ships of subsystems of analysis and subsystems of EM; we do not take these up 
here. 
1.2. Another model of EM 
In order to establish various consistency results, we shall use the technique of 
realizability followed by interpretation i a model. We shall use altogether three 
different models of EM: Feferman's model discussed in Section 1.1, the model 
given in this section, and a model based on normal terms to be given in a later 
section. We may summarize a principle of construction common to all three as 
follows: Starting with a model of the basic (combinatorial) axioms of EM, we can 
define an e-relation and an interpretation of CI by induction in such a way that the 
result will be a model of EM. (For details see [11].) In order to construct models of 
EM with certain desired properties, we therefore become interested in constructing 
models of the combinatorial part of EM. These are closely related to the BRFT's 
and "enumerative systems" of [13], the principal difference being that here we have 
only definition by cases for N, not for all elements. We characterize these models in 
the following definition and lemma. 
Definition. A weak BRFT is a set S together with a class C of partial functions (of 
several variables) from S to S, such that the following hold: 
(1) C includes a pairing function p and unpairing functions Pu P~. 
(2) There is a distinguished element 0; regarding p (x, 0) as the successor function 
x', let N denote the last subset of S containing 0 and closed under successor; we 
must have 0 is not a pair. 
(3) There is a definition-by-cases-in-N function d(a, b, x, y) which, for x and y in 
N, is a i fx=y,  b if x~y.  
(4) C is closed under generalized composition, and contains the constant and 
projection functions. 
(5) There is a binary function 0 in C which is a universal function for the unary 
functions in C; that is, each unary f in C is of the form, f (x)  ~ f)(e, x) for some e in 
S. We write ft, for f ;  e is called an index of f. 
ha [13] it is shown that in a BRFT, the pairing function can be used to define a 
universal n + 1-ary function, and s-m-n functions connecting the n-ary universal 
functions for different n. The same argument works for weak BRFTs as well. 
Lemma 1.2.1. Let (S,C) beaweak  BRFT. Define App(e ,x ,y ) toho ld inS /us t in  
case fJe (x ) is defined and has value y. Then the constants of EM can be interpreted so 
as to produce a model of EM on S. 
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Proof. We adapt the A-notat ion of K leene to present circumstances; thus 
Axf(x, y) is an index of Axf(x, y) obta ined via s-m-n functions f rom y and an index 
o f f .  Now we interpret 0 as the 0 in S; k as AxAyf(x,y) ,  where f is a project ion 
function in C;  d as AxAyAzAw d(x, y, z, w); s as AxAyAz 0(0(x, z), 0(y, z )); and p, 
pl, and p2 as the pairing and unpairing functions of C; or more  precisely, p as 
AxAyp(x,  y), pt and p2 as indices of pl and p2. This much makes S into a model of 
the combinator ia l  part of EM;  now we complete it to a model  of EM as described 
above. This completes the proof. 
Next we want to construct a part icular model of EM. A partial function is an 
operat ion f rom N N to N in S if its domain includes all x such that Vn E N(0x(n) 
defined and in N), and for all such x its value is in N. We write s ~< t for sequence 
numbers  s and t to mean s is an initial segment of t. 
Theorem 1.2.1. There is a model ~ of EM in which every operation from N N to N 
is continuous. In fact, if X is any subset of (N~) ~, then every operation F from X to N 
is continuous in the strong sense that there is an operation ~b such that r is defined 
for all sequence numbers ; s <~ t & ~(s) = 0---~ ~b(t) = O; ~O(s) > 0---~ F(f)  = tp(s) - 1 
for all f with initial segment s. Moreover, r can be obtained from F by means of an 
operation in dL 
Remark .  Note that we are not saying every extensional operat ion,  but every 
operat ion.  
Proof. Somewhat  surprisingly, such a model  can be constructed without using any 
recursion theory. We take the universe of our model  to be the set of all partial  
funct ions f rom N to N. We will define an operat ion of application f[g] on this set S 
in such a way that if C = {Agf [g ] : fE  S} then (S, C)  is a weak BRFT.  
Something similar was done by Kleene, whose notion of "countable funct ional" 
gives rise to an application operat ion a (/3), where/3 is a total function from N to N. 
With such a notion there can be no hope of a "universal funct ion";  we have to have 
a self-operating system of partial functions. Nevertheless, our idea is similar to 
K leene's :  to compute  f [g ] (n ) ,  we feed finite pieces of (g), = Axg(x, n) to (J'). ; if 
( f ) ,  outputs  0, this means "not  enough information about g" ;  if (f),  outputs j + 1, 
then we would like to put f[g] (n) = j ;  but some care is called for to make sure the 
operat ion is well-defined. 
We establish some notation. We will use r ,s , t  for sequence numbers,  so 
s = ((s)0,. . . ,  (s) , - t )  with n = lh(s). We write s _C g to mean that s codes a finite 
subset of the graph of g, i.e. 
Vi < lh(s)3 k((s), = (g(k ), k )). 
We write Fun(s)  to mean s codes a piece of some function (i.e. is single-valued); 
this is a recursive relation. We write (s) k for the]  such that Q', k) is (s), for some i, 
in case Fun(s )  and such i exists. Otherwise, (s) k is undefined. In this proof only, we 
use t C s to mean that Vk(( t )  k ,~ ~ (s) k = (t)k). We have to de f ine f [g l , . . . ,g , , ]  as 
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well as f [g] ;  in this context we allow g to stand for an m -tuple gt . . . . .  g,, ; then s _C g 
means s = (s, , . . . ,  s., ) with s, C_ g~, and (g). is the m -tuple (gt)n,..., (g,.). ; similarly 
for t C_ s. With these conventions we shall never need to mention n-tuples gt,..., gm 
explicitly. This is convenient, because it allows us to use the abbreviation f, for (f) ,  
(in this proof only). 
Let Con(s, t) be 
Vk~<lh(s)((s)  k ~,&(t) k $ ~(s )  k=(t )k ) ;  
i.e. s and t are consistent. It is convenient (and legitimate) to assume that 
t C s --~ t ~< s, and that every number is a sequence number. 
We now define f [g] .  By definition, f [g ]  (n) = m if there is an s ___ g,, such that 
f,, (s) > 0 & Vr <~ sf, (r) $ & Vr <-<- s(Con(r, s) & f,, (r) > 0---, f. (r) = f, (s)) 
and m + 1= fo(s). 
To help in understanding this definition, first note that fig] (n) is well-defined. 
That is, if st and s2 are two values of s as in the definition, say with st ~< sa, then 
since s~_Cg, and s~Cg,, we have Con(s2, s,), so putting r =s~, s = s2 in the 
definition, we see that/o (s~) = f,(s~). It may well be that st and s2 have no common 
domain; but before we allow f[g](n) to be defined on account of [,(s) being 
positive, we check to make sure no smaller consistent r could "upset the 
calculation". Note also that if f and g are partial recursive, so is fig], as we can 
recursively carry out a search for a suitable s _C g,. 
Now we shall prove there is a binary function universal for the unary functions. 
Define 
{~)" if ( t)~>O&Vr<~s(t) ' '&Vr<~s 
0(t, s, n) = (Con(r, s)&(t)" > 0--* (t)' = (t)'), 
otherwise. 
We write O(t,s) for O,(t,s), which does not depend on n. We claim O[.f, g](n)- - -  
f[g] (n) for all n. First the easy direction: suppose O[f, g] (n) = m ; we must show 
f [g ] (n )= m. Since O[f,g] (n) = m, there are t and s such that tC_f,, s C_g,, and 
O(t, s) = m + 1, and whenever  ~< s, w ~< t with Con(r, s )&Con (w, t), and O(w, r) > 
O, then O(w, r) = m + 1. Take w = t. We have Vr <~ s(t)' ,~, since O(t, s) > O. Since 
tCf, ,  we have (t) '=f,(r)  when (t)" is defined. Hence f [g ] (n )=( t ) ' - l=  
0(t, s, n) - 1 = m. 
Next the more difficult direction. Suppose f [g ] (n )= m;  we must show 
O[]:,g](n)---m. We have tC_f,, sC_g, with 
(t)" = m + l&Vw <-s(t)" ~, &Vw ~ s(Con(w,s)&(t) ~ > 0--->(t) TM = (t) ') ,  
namely t coding the initial segment 15,, (s), which must be defined, by the second 
clause in the definition of f[g]. Thus 0(t, s) (t)" =/,, (s) = m + 1. What remains to be 
shown is that this "calculat ion" by the universal function cannot be "upset"  by 
smaller consistent pieces of f and g. 
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Suppose 
t' ~ t & s' ~< s & Con (t', t) & Con (s ', s ) & 0(t', s ') > 0. 
We must show ~(t', s') = ~J(t, s). That is, (t' 7' = (t) '. Since ~J(t', s') > 0, we have 
(1) (t ')~'>O&Vw ~< s'(t') ~ ,[, &Vw <~s'(Con(w,s')&(t') w > 0---~ (t')w--~ (t')~). 
Also, since ~(t, s )> 0, we have 
(t) s >0&Vw <~ s (t) ~ ,~ &Vw <~ s(Con(w,s)&(t )  w > 0---~(t) "~ = (t)').  
Take w = s'. Since s '~  < s&Con(s ,s ' ) ,  we have 
(2) (t)" $ &( ( t ) ">0~ ( ty= (tT). 
Note that Con(t, t') implies that (t') '~ = (t) w when both are defined. Put w ~- s' in 
this formula; since (t') s' and (t)" are both defined, we have ( t ' ) "= (t) '~'. Since 
(t')" > 0 by (1), we have ( tT '> 0. Hence, by (2), (t)" = (t)'. Combining equations, we 
have (t')" = (t)" = (t) ~, which was what we had to prove. It is now established that ~J 
9 is a universal function. 
We still have to verify the other four conditions on a weak BRFT.  Let 0 be 
interpreted as hx0, and define a pairing function p in S by 
p (f, g ) = 
1 if x =0,  
Thus 0 is never a pair. The interpretation of an integer k is a rather spotty-looking 
function, which is zero after a certain point, say 3k. Call this function k*; it is 
always total. There is a recursive function f such that for all g, if g is k * for some k, 
then f [g ] (0 )= k. This is not completely obvious; we have to introduce f by 
recursion. The point is, that an " integer" k can be recognized by its initial 
segments, by repeatedly taking "predecessors" of it until we come to a function 
with a zero in the first place. If we started with an integer k *, then k is the number 
of times we took predecessors. We leave the details to the reader. Using this 
function, the reader may easily define a definition-by-cases function. Note that we 
cannot get a general definition-by-cases, only definition-by-integer-cases, which is 
all that is required. The reader may also check that the constant and projection 
functions are represented. We discuss closure under generalized composition. 
Suppose f and g are given; is there an h such that for all x, we have h[x]-~ 
f[g[x]]? Intuitively, to compute h, we feed pieces of x to g until we can compute 
enough values of g[x], to find h[x] (n). Note  that we have actually to feed pieces of 
g[x], to f , ;  to get these pieces, we will have to feed pieces of x~,.,,~ to g~ ...... ~ for 
various m. With these remarks we leave the details to the reader. We have now 
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proved that (S,C) is a weak BRFT. It remains to discuss the continuity of 
operations from N N to N. 
Note first that ,kgf[g] is continuous for total g. Indeed, if f(s, n) > 0 and the other 
clauses in the definition of f[g] (n) are satisfied, then (s)' is defined for all r less 
than m, the greatest value such that (s) '~ is defined. Then m is a modulus of 
continuity for 2tgf[g] (n). But, the operations from N N to N are not exactly these, 
since the integers are represented by the functions k * discussed above. However, 
there are natural isomorphisms between the real integers N and the integers N* of 
(S, C); between the functions )tgf[g] from N* to N* and NN; and between the 
functions Agf[g] from N *~" to N* and a subset of the functions from N N to N. We 
have already discussed the function c such that c[k*] (0) = k. Now if g ~ N ~, define 
g,[h]=(g(c[h]))*; this is legitimate. If F:N*N'---~N * in (S,C), define t6 by 
F [g] (n )= c[F[g,]]; this also can be done. Now, as discussed above, P is 
continuous; but a modulus of continuity for F is also one for F. The function qJ 
mentioned in the statement of the theorem could be AsF(s, 0), if this is total. It will 
be total, for instance, if P is produced as F[g](n)  = c[O[F,g,]], where ~1 is the 
universal function. (For readers familiar with Kleene's notion: if we allow partially 
undefined associates, we can use the universal function to show we can always find a 
total associate.) Technically, this ~ has the desired property with C instead of ~ ; 
but this defect is easily remedied. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
Remark. The preceding proof remains valid if we consider only the recursive 
partial functions instead of all partial functions. That is, the universal function 0 is 
recursive, the operation f[g] leads from partial recursive functions to partial 
recursive functions, etc. Thus we get two different models, depending whether we 
take all partial functions or recursive partial functions. 
Recall that KSnig's lemma states that any infinite binary tree has an infinite path; 
later on we shall consider a formal version of KSnig's lemma, but for now we 
consider it informally; and the reasoning in the next theorem will be classical. 
Theorem 1.2.2. There is a model ~ of EM with the property of Theorem 1.2.1 
which has in addition the property that every operation from 2 N to N is bounded, i.e., 
VG EN2~3m ~ NVf  E2NG(f)<~ m. There is also a model Y of EM with the 
property of Theorem 1.2.1 which fails to satisfy K6nig's lemma for some recursive 
tree. 
Proof. The model ~/ is the model constructed in Theorem 1.2.1 with classical 
partial functions, so that K6nig's lemma holds. To see that operations from 2 N to N 
are bounded, let G be an operation from 2 N to N; by the construction of ~R, there is 
an operation 0 defined on all sequence numbers such that 0(s)>0 implies 
G(f)  = 0(s)- i  for any f with initial segment s, and s C t &0(s) > 0---~ 0(t) = 0(s); 
and for all f in 2 r', 0(s) > 0 for some initial segment s of f. Let T be the tree of all s 
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such that 0(s) = 0; then T has no infinite path and so, by K6nig's lemma, is finite. 
Let m = maximum of I~(s) for s ---- t*(n), t E T. Then m is the desired bound for G. 
To construct the model N, we follow the construction of Theorem 1.2.1, but using 
recursive partial functions. It is well-known that there is a recursive tree which is 
infinite but has no recursive path. For a classical proof see [27]; the proof is not hard 
to constructivize, though we do not need that here. 
1.3. Normal forms for terms in EM 
For background information on the concept of normal forms for terms, see [29, p. 
100] where arithmetic of finite types is treated. Our approach to the analysis of 
terms of EM is pragmat ic - -we do the minimum needed to obtain the results we 
need later. Roughly speaking, our purpose is simply to identify the closed terms t 
which various theories prove to be in N. For EM and EMb, the answer is that t is 
provably equal to some numeral; for EMa, the answer is more complicated, but just 
what is needed later on. 
For simplicity, we begin with EM. We will define, as in [29] for HA% the 
concepts: 
t contracts to h, 
t ~t~ (t reduces to t~), 
t is normal. 
Definition. (1) t contracts to t~ if and only if one of the following clauses is satisfied: 
(a) t = ktlt2, 
(b) t=sxyz  and t~=xz(yz) ,  
(c) t = dt~t2hft, or t = dt2t th~ with n~ rn, 
(d) t=  pl(pt~t2) or t=  p~(pt:t:). 
(2) t reduces immediately to t~ if tl is obtained from t by contraction of a single 
subterm (occurrence) of t. 
(3) t ~> s if there is a sequence t = to , . . ,  t, = s with t~ reducing immediately to 
t~+~. Such a sequence is called a reduction sequence from t to s. 
(4) t is normal if t admits no contradictions. 
Remarks. This definition is fairly standard. It is important for what follows that 
we have only definition by integer cases; otherwise the definition of contractions i
much more difficult. Also, it is important hat we don't require everything to be a 
pair; surjective pairing functions are also a stumbling-block in combinatory logic. 
Note that there are no contraction rules involving the c,'s, j, or i. It is this feature 
of EM that makes normal forms usefu l - - there are no general procedures for 
constructing operations from classifications. This may seem strange, but consider an 
example. Suppose the term t gives the infimum of a uniformly continuous function f
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on a compact set S. The term t will not involve S essentially, but instead the 
operations which carry the information about the compactness of S. 
The main combinatory theorem which we need about terms is the following: 
Lemma 1.3.1 (Uniqueness of normal form). I f  t ~ s and t >~ r, and both r and s are 
normal, then s = r. 
Proof. Curch and Rosser proved this for the system built up from k and s only. In 
addition, we have pairing functions, a definition-by-cases function, and some 
constants which don't appear in any reduction rules (co,/, 1 and 0 to be precise). It 
has to be checked that the proof (e.g. the proof on pp. 108-109 of [29]) still works. 
The extra constants which don't occur in reduction rules are no problem, but 
definition-by-cases and pairing functions add at least half a dozen extra cases to the 
argument at the top of p. 109 in [29]. We have checked each case, and patient 
readers will find it simple to do so themselves. 
Lemma 1.3.2. I f  t reduces to s, then EMN ~- t ---- s. 
Proof. The reader can check that if t contracts to s, then EMN ~- t -~ s. The result 
follows by induction on the length of a reduction sequence from t to s. 
Let us denote by NF the set of closed terms of EM in normal form. 
Lemma 1.3.3. NF is a model of  EM, with App(t, r, s) holding iff tr reduces to s, 
and CI and e interpreted as in Feferman's  model. 
Proof. By Lemma 1.3.1, the axiom App(x, y, z )&App(x,  y, w)~ z = w holds in 
NF. The other combinatorial xioms are easily checked, except for --1 pxy =- O. We 
have to show that for t and s closed normal terms, pts cannot reduce to 0. If it did, 
by Lemma 1.3.2, EMN would prove pts -~ 0; in particular, pts ~- 0 would hold in 
Feferman's model, which is impossible, since 0 is not a pair in Feferman's model. 
The axioms for C1, join, comprehension, and induction are treated as in Feferman's 
model. This completes the proof. 
It may seem that our use of the expression NF~ 0(t) (for t a normal application 
term) is ambiguous, since t could be regarded either as a term to be interpreted in
NF or as a parameter f om NF. This ambiguity is only apparent, in view of the fact 
that NF~ 0(t)~-~0(t), where the t on the left is an application term, and on the 
right, a parameter in NF. This is easily checked by induction on the complexity of ~. 
Lemma 1.3.4. Suppose EM ~ t ,1,, for t a closed application term. Then t reduces to 
a normal term t*, and hence EMN~-t ~ t* 
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Proof. For t as in the lemma, we define t* and verify the conclusion of the lemma, 
inductively on the complexity of t. For t a constant, t* is t. Then (ts)* is the (unique) 
term q such that NF~ t *s* -~q;  q exists since t ' s *  is provably defined, being 
provably equal to ts by induction hypothesis. Furthermore, since t reduces to t* 
and s reduces to s*, ts reduces to q. This completes the proof. 
Remark. This result shows essentially that reducing t is a sufficiently general 
method of trying to prove t is defined, just as calculation in number theory is a 
sufficient method of trying to prove any true Z~ sentence. Here of course we get the 
result only relative to EM, not relative to truth; we know too little about operations 
to assert that (informally) if t is defined then it has a terminating reduction 
sequence. 
Theorem 1.3.1. Let EM F t ~ N, for t a closed term. Then for some integer m, 
EMN F t ~ fit. I[ t is normal then t is identical to ~.  
Proof. If EMFtEN,  then t is provably defined and tEN holds in NF. The 
interpretation of t in NFis t*, a normal term to which t standard reduces and hence 
is provably equivalent. But the interpretation of N in NF is just the numerals. 
Hence t* is a numeral n5 as desired in the theorem. This completes the proof. 
We have now carried our analysis of the terms of EM far enough; our next 
project is to carry out a similar analysis for EMb. Recall from Section 0.3 that EMb 
is based on a fixed complete separable metric space X and a fixed element of X, 
with X in standard form, so that f E NN; the constant h is intended to be interpreted 
as f. We define reductions and normal terms for EMb just as for EM, except hat we 
allow the reduction rules h(rfi ) reduces to f (m ), for each integer m. Then the entire 
analysis goes through as before, with EM replaced by EMb and EMN replaced by 
EMNb. The principal point to check is the extension of the Church-Rosser 
theorem on uniqueness of normal form to the system of terms including the 
constant b and new reduction rules. These new rules don't create any trouble, 
because they can only be applied at the last possible stage, i.e. if b(t) reduces 
according to the new rule, it is because t is already a numeral r~; so there is no 
other way/~(t) can reduce. This argument takes care of the additional case required 
on p. 109 of [29] to make the proof cover EMb also. The result of all this, then, is 
Theorem 1.3.2. Let EMB ~- t E N, for t a closed term. Then for some integer m, 
EMb I- t = nq. I f  t normal then t is identical with ~.  
Next we wish to prove similar results for the theory EMa. Since the numerical 
terms of EMa include e.g., a(0), we cannot expect hem to be numerals. The answer 
we want is essentially that the value of each term t, which can be proved to be in N, 
depends only on an initial segment of a. Since we shall make use of EMa only in 
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case the underlying space X is compact, we shall assume that X is a compact space 
in standard form. Then we shall also show that each numerical term is provably 
bounded by a numeral. In order to state our theorem precisely, we first define a 
function Val,(x) for each term t and finite sequence x of integers. Val,(x) is 
computed by reducing t to normal form, using in addition to the reduction values of 
EM, the new rules that: a(ff~) contracts to (x),, if m < lh(x). As for EMb, the 
Church-Rosser theorem extends to this situation to guarantee that Val,(x) is 
unique, if it is defined. 
By writing x _C a, we mean that the sequence x codes an initial segment of a; that 
is, we abbreviate Vj < lh(x)(x)j = a(/'). Note that, for fixed t, the partial function 
Val,(x) is given in EMN by an application term, as is every partial recursive 
function; we use the same symbols Val, for this application term. 
Lemma 1.3.5. EMal-x Ca&Val r (x )  $ ~Va l , (x )~r .  
Proof. Like Lemma 1.3.2. 
Next we would like to obtain information about the numerical terms of EMa, 
that is, about the terms t such that EMal- t  E N. Such a term is essentially a 
function on the space X, whose argument is given by the constant a. We want to 
prove essentially that the function defined by t is uniformly continuous. The natural 
thing to try is to make a model of the terms of EMa. But what kind of model? We 
want to make, not a classical model, but a Kripke model or something like it, with 
nodes a corresponding to initial segments of members of X, and define 
o~ II- App(t, r, s) iff Val,r(t~) = s, and a II- t = s iff Val,(a) = Vale(a). But, we cannot 
use a Kripke model, since in a Kripke model, atomic formulae must be decided at 
the first stage, and we don't want to decide, for instance, the value of a(5) until the 
fifth stage. Faced with this difficulty, I abandoned the model-theoretic approach, 
and invented the version of forcing which is given below, in Section 1.8, to solve the 
problem. Later I realized that the proper kind of model to use is a Beth model, but 
that the necessary details were longer than the forcing proof. Still later I realized 
that forcing and Beth models are two ways of looking at essentially the same thing. 
This will be discussed further in Section 1.8. For now, we leave off our discussion of 
computable terms to develop another important ool. 
1.4. Realizability and explicit definability 
In this section we use realizability to establish explicit definability results for EM 
and certain auxiliary theories. These results are of two kinds: the first says that if 
3xAx is provable, then so is A (t) for some term t. These come quite directly from 
realizability. The second kind, known as numerical explicit definability results, say 
that if 3x U N A (x) is provable, then so is A (th) for some integer n. These results, 
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which are of considerable intrinsic interest, seem to require the analysis of normal 
terms given in the previous section, combined with the first kind of explicit 
definability result. 
The realizability which we make use of could be called, "q-realizability for EM", 
since it is like q-realizability for HA w in [29]. It is defined like Feferman's 
realizability in Section 1.1, except that we modify the clauses for implication, 
disjunction, and existential quantification as follows: 
fr (A --~ B) is Vq (qrA &A ---~f(q) rB), 
f r (3xA ) is 3x (A & f -~p(plf, x) & plftA ), 
fr (A v B) is (Plf = O-e,A &p2frA)&(pl f /0- -~ B &pJ rB) .  
These same clauses also serve to define q-realizability for EMa and EMb. 
In order to verify that the comprehension axiom is realized, we shall have to 
know that the formulae 0 which can occur there are equivalent tO the realizability 
interpretations. That is the content of the following lemma. 
Lemma 1.4.1. Let ~ be a formula containing no 3 or V . Let A be a formula of the 
form O(t), found by substituting application terms tfor some of the free variables of O. 
Then there is an application term t~ such that 
O) EMF-A---~tarA, 
(ii) EM~-Vf(frA ---~ A). 
Remark. There is no need to restrict I~ to be elementary either for this lemma or 
the soundness theorem below; of course if we allow non-elementary 0 in the 
comprehension axiom we have a soundness theorem for an inconsistent theory, 
which is valid for these formal versions of realizability, but useless. 
Proof. First, in case A is 1~ itself, i.e., does not contain application terms, (i) and 
(ii) may be proved by induction on the complexity of 0. Define tA as follows in this 
case: 
tA is 0 for A atomic, 
twx is AXtA, tA&B is (tA, tB), tA--,B is AqtB. 
We leave it to the reader to check (i) and (ii) in this case. Now, if application terms 
do occur in A, recall that 0(s) is short for 3y (s =- y &0(y)); so if A is 0(s), we can 
take ta to be ((t,,.y, to), s), provided we can define t,..y properly. This can easily be 
done by induction on the complexity of the term t, We leave the reader to examine 
the definition of f r  3xB carefully and fill in the formal details. 
Theorem 1.4.1 (Soundness of q-realizability for EM). I f  EM ~- A, then for some 
application term t, EMt- t rA .  The same holds with EM replaced by EMa or EMB, 
or EMN. 
Proof. A straightforward induction on the length of the proof of A, which we 
leave to the reader. The lemma above is the key to realizing the comprehension 
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schema. Induction is used to realize induction; and to realize induction on N, only 
induction on N is needed. In the case of EMa, we have to realize the axiom a E X ;  
but this has already been taken care of in the lemma, since we may assume X is 
given by an application term, in which case a E X is of the form ~(t) with t = X and 
el(y) being a ~ y ; hence EMa F a E X ~ s r a E X for some term s; but a E X is an 
axiom of EMa, so EMaFsraUX.  Similarly for EMb, where we also have to 
consider the axioms giving the values of b. It has to be noted that the proof of the 
lemma applies also in case EM is replaced by EMa or EMb. 
Theorem 1.4.2 (Explicit Definability). 
(A) I f  EM F 3 xP(x ), then for some term t of EM whose free variables are those of 
3xP(x) ,  EM F P(t). Also, the same holds with EM replaced by EMa, EMb, or 
EMN. 
(B) Let P have only x free. I f  EMF-3x ~ NP(x),  then for some integer m, 
EM F P(r~ ). Also, the same holds with EM replaced by EMN or EMb (but not 
EMa). 
Proof. For  (A), suppose EM F : lxP(x). Then by Theorem 1.4.1, EM F s r 3xP(x) ,  
for some term s whose free variables y are those of 3xP(x).  Take t to be Xyp2s. 
Then EM F P(t), by the definition of q-realizability. This proves (A) for EM; EMa, 
EMb, and EMN are treated similarly. For (B), we make use of the analysis of 
normal terms in Section 1.3, particularly Theorems 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. If 
EM ~- P( t )&  t E N, then t is provably equal to some numeral r~ ; hence EM F P(ff~). 
Similarly for EMb and EMN. 
1.5. Formalizing the metamathematics 
In this section, we provide the formalized versions of our previous theorems 
which are needed to establish certain derived rules later on. In particular, we need 
formalized v'ersions of the explicit definability theorems of the last section. We 
cannot formalize these in EM as they stand, but shall have to make use of a 
sequence of (increasing) systems EM, whose union is EM, and such that EM can 
formalize the necessary metamathematics for EM,,. The construction of EM~ will 
be essentially the same as the corresponding constructions in arithmetic and set 
theory. First we define the complexity of a formula, then give a truth-definition i
EM for formulae of bounded complexity, then take EM, to be EM with axioms and 
proofs restricted to have complexity bounded by n. Here is a subtle point: If we 
take EM,  to have axioms of bounded complexity, but arbitrary proofs allowed, then 
we have to make use of formalized cut-elimination theorems. This detailed 
argument can be avoided by our definition of EM, (given precisely below). The 
reader who is convinced by this sketch can proceed to Theorem 1.5.2 below. 
Let us define the complexity of a formula of EM as follows: If A is prime, the 
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complexity of A is the greatest integer n such that some constant c, occurs in A. 
Then set 
complexity (A & B ) = complexity (A ~ B)  = complexity (A v B ) 
= 1 + max(complexity (A), complexity (B)); 
complexity (3xA)  = complexity (VxA)  = 1 + complexity (A). 
Note the complication introduced by having infinitely many constants in the 
language. 
Lemma 1.5.1. For each n, there is a formula Tr. with two free variables such that 
EMN~-Tr , ( 'A ' ,x )~-~A(x)  for each f ixed formula A of complexity <~ n. Here 
Tr,,('A ', x)  abbreviates Tr, ('A ', (xz, . . ., xk)) in case x is a list of  the k free variables 
of A. 
Proof. We define Tr, by induction on n. Tr0(n,x) is a disjunction of clauses 
according to the form of the formula with G6del number n: 
n = 'App(wl, w2, w3)' for variables w,, w2, w3&App((x)l, (x)~, (x)3) 
n = 'App(c, w2, w3)' for c a constant, w2, Wa variables, &App(c,  (x)l, (x)2). (note 
that this is one clause for each constant c). 
n = 'Cl(w)' for w a variable & Cl(x) 
n = 'CI(c)' for c a particular constant &Cl(c) 
n = 'u  E v' for u, v variables &(x) iE (x )2  
The reader can supply the remaining disjuncts, corresponding to different place- 
ment of constants in atomic formulae. The inductive definition gives Trk~l as 
follows: 
Trk+~(n, x) is again a disjunction of clauses, 
n = 'VwA '&Vz Tr, ( 'A ', (x, z)) (if w is the last one in the list of free variables of 
A ; other similar clauses apply otherwise), 
n = '3 wA '  & 3 z Tr,, ('A ', (x, z )), 
n = 'A  o B '  & Tr , ( 'A  ', x )oTr , ( 'B ' ,  x )  for o a propositional connective. 
Now an easy induction on the complexity of A shows that the conclusion of the 
theorem is true. In fact, EMN can be replaced in the theorem by EMNk for a 
certain fixed k ; we do not really need induction; probably k = 27 suffices. The  only 
point worth remarking about the proof is that e.g., if n is the G6del number  of a 
formula of the form VxAx,  then this fact is provable in EMN, since being a formula 
of this form is a recursive relation~ This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Let us write Tr,, ('A ') in place of Tr. ( 'A ', x )  where x is a list of the free variables 
of A. 
Now, the obvious definition of EM, would be to take EM,, as the fragment of 
EM with axioms restricted to be of complexity ~< n. If we do this, we have to appeal 
to formalized cut-elimination theorems. The following device enables us to avoid 
using cut-elimination. Define the proofs of EM.  to be those proofs of EM involving 
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only formulae of complexity ~< n. Let Pr,(x) be the natural formal expression of 
the resulting provability predicate. Thus EM, is not a formal system in the usual 
sense, but provability in EM, makes sense, and suffices for our purposes. The point 
is that each theorem of EM is provable in some EM,, and we have 
EM F Pr, ('A ') ---> Tr. ('A ') (1) 
(proved in EM by induction on the length of proofs in EM,). 
By the reflection principle for EM,, we mean the schema (for all formulae A) 
Pr, ('A ') ~ A. 
If T is EMN, EMa, EMb, etc., we can define complexity and define T,,, by 
restricting proofs to formulae of complexity ~n.  We can give the provability 
predicate Pra. (k, 'A')  in EM for formulae A of EMa. We have a truth-definition 
Tr,, (a, 'A ') for EMa,, which expresses that the fomula A of EMa of complexity ~< n 
is true when the constant a is interpreted as the clement a of X. (Thus a is a 
variable in the formula Tr. (a, 'A ')). Replacing the constant a by h, we have a 
similar truth definition for EMb,. Since the theory EMb depends on b as well as on 
the fixed space X, we give in EM the proof-predicate for EMb,, with a variable b, 
Prfb,(b, k,'A'). For EMa, (1) holds in the form 
EM F Pra,, (a, 'A ')---> Tr. (a, 'A') (a is a variable). (2) 
For EMb, a stronger version is true: 
Prfb.(b, k, 'n  (b)')& k (k) = b(k)-* Tr,, (w, k, 'A (b)'). (3) 
The significance of k is that (by the usual properties of G6del numbers) k will be an 
upper bound to the j 's  such that some axiom b()-) = rfi is used in the proof of A (b). 
The formula (3) then asserts that if b is interpreted as any function in X agreeing 
with b on the first k values, then A (b) will be true. (2) and (3) can be proved in EM 
by induction on the lengths of proofs in EMa,, and EMb., respectively. 
The reflection principle for EMa. is 
a E X&Pra,('A')--->Tr,(a, 'A'), 
for each formula A of EMa. The reflection principle for EMb, is 
b E X &PrL (b, k, 'A (b)')& ~,(k)= b(k)--->A (w), 
for each formula A of EM. 
Theorem 1.5.1. For each fixed n, EM proves each instance of the reflection 
principles[or EMa,, EMb,, and EM. ; also the same with EM replaced by EMN. 
Proof. First, we consider EM,. Argue in EM: Suppose Pr,('A'). Then A is of 
complexity ~< n, and by (1) above, Tr,('A'); but by Lemma 1.5.1, Tr,('A')---->A. 
Hence A. This proves the reflection principle for EM.. 
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Turning to EMa,, we simply repeat he above argument, appealing to (2) instead 
of (1), and to the properties of the truth definition analogous to Lemma 1.5.1. 
Similarly, the reflection principle for EMb,  is proved using (3) instead of (1). 
All the arguments of this section remain valid if EM is replaced by EMN. This 
completes the proof. 
We now move on to formalizing the theorems of the previous sections. 
Lemma 1.5.2. 
are provable in 
by EMa., and 
The (natural formalizations of) Theorems 1.3.1, 1.3.2, and 1.3.3 
EM, provided that in their statements, EM is replaced by EM., EMa 
EMb by EMb,,, for n fixed, and sufficiently large. 
Proof. First, we note that the Church-Rosser theorem (Lemma 1.3.1) is formaliza- 
ble in EMN, by direct transcription of the proof in [29, p. 108]. In fact, Troelstra 
remarks (p. 110) on the elementary nature of the proof. Next, observe that in 
Lemma 1.3.2, we do not really need EMN, but only EMN without the induction 
schema; thus modified, Lemma 1.3.2 is provable in EM. In order to formalize 
Lemma 1.3.3, we first note that NF can be defined in EM, either by a formula or as 
a classification if the reduction sequences are carried along. One then gives within 
EM a "truth definition" for satisfaction in NF, for elementary formulae of 
complexity bounded by n. We use the induction schema in EM to define the 
interpretations of C1 and E .  Then we can give a "truth definition" for aZl (possibly 
non-elementary) formulae of bounded complexity, and show by induction on the 
length of a proof in EM~ that each theorem of EM~ holds in NF. This completes the 
formalization of Lemma 1.3.3. 
Lemma 1.3.4 has the following version. Suppose EM~ F t $, for t closed. Then t 
reduces to t* normal, and hence EMN l- t ~ t*. This is provable in EM for each 
fixed n. Note that since EM, F t ,[,, the complexity of t is also bounded, in order 
that t $ be a fomula of complexity ~< n. This formalized Lemma 1.3.4 would be 
completely straightforward if EM,, were a formal system in the usual sense, i.e. 
closed under deduction. This comes in when we have EM,  F t ~ t*, EM,  F s ~ s*, 
EM,~-ts $, and we want EM, F t*s*~.  Actually we can only assert 
EMm,,) k t*s * ~, where H(n)  is some explicit monotone function of n. In the course 
of building up t (which is of complexity ~< n) we have to apply this step of the proof 
n times. Therefore let k = H(H . . .  H(n 9 9 .) (iterated n times). Then, carrying out 
the n steps of the induction leading up to t, all the proofs asserted to exist in EM 
will actually exist in EM~. (The idea is that although EM,, is not Closed under 
deduction, in this case we only need a bounded number of deductions beyond 
EM,.) This completes the formalization of Lemma 1.3.4. 
These formalized lemmas are all that is needed to formalize the proof of 
Theorem 1.3.1, with EM,  in place of EM. Similarly for Theorem 1.3.2 and 
Theorem 1.3.3, provided n is large enough that EM, proves X is a complete 
separable metric space in standard form (and for Theorem 1.3.3, compact). This 
completes the proof of the lemma. 
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Next we have to formalize the soundness theorem for q-realizability. Some 
general remarks are appropriate: Among theorems known as "soundness theorems 
for realizability", some are provable outright, whereas eemingly minor variants 
require restriction to formulae of bounded complexity. The general rule seems to 
be that any soundness theorem from which one can get explicit (numerical) 
definability theorems cannot be proved in its full form, but the weaker soundness 
theorems can. Consider, by way of illustration, two forms of the soundness theorem 
for ordinary 1945-realizability for HA [29]: 
(i) Pr('A')---~ 3x Pr('s 
(ii) Pr('A')---~ Pr('3xxrA'). 
(Both of these, if precisely formulated, would contain a variable for 'A'; the G6del 
number '~rA'  is a primitive recursive function of x and 'A'.) 
Form (i) will yield explicit numerical definability (at least for A varying over 
primitive recursive predicates; we have to use q-realizability if we want more). 
Form (ii) will not obviously ield it. Now let us try to formalize the soundness proof 
for (i). Suppose Pr('~r (A---~ B)') and Pr('~rA'). Then Pr ('3n (Texn& UnrB)'), 
but we cannot get :In (Texn&Pr('UnrB')), which is what we need to prove (i). On 
the other hand the corresponding step for (ii) goes through straightforwardly. 
The above remarks can be "nailed down" by the observation that the explicit 
definability property (even for primitive recursive A) cannot be proved in HA; 
hence the soundness theorem (i) cannot be proved in HA. This was pointed out to 
us by Professor Kreisel: The explicit definability property in question, together with 
Con(HA), is all that is needed in G6del's second incompleteness theorem to 
establish the independence of his sentence 0 such that b0"~,-'nPr('0'). But it is 
known that Con(HA) alone does not suffice. 
Turning to EM, we see that the soundness theorem is more like (ii) than (i); even 
though we require "explicit" realizations, these are only given by application terms, 
and we cannot get numerical explicit definability without further analysis. Indeed, 
suppose Pr('tr(A---~B)') and Pr('srA'); then Pr('3y(y-~ts&yrB)'),  i.e., 
Pr('tsrB'). Note that although "tsrB" has the appearance of explicitness, when 
written out as "3y(y -~ts&yrB)"  it looks less explicit. True explicitness is 
provided only by the preceding analysis of normal terms, which we could only 
formalize by restricting the complexity (and which the above remarks how cannot 
be completely formalized.) 
Lemma 1.5.3 (formalized soundness theorem for q-realizability). Theorem 1.4.1 
can be proved in EMN in its most natural formalization, i.e., without restricting 
complexity of formulae. Furthermore, even the following strengthened version can be 
proved in EMN: There is a specific primitive recursive function Y such that if 
EM, I-A, then EMm,~ I-trA for some application term t. Similarly with EM replaced 
by EMN, EMb, EMa, etc. 
Proof. We have already discussed the essential ideas. The crucial point is that the 
induction step from knowing the premises of a rule are provable and provably 
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realized by terms t, s, to knowing that the conclusion of the rule is probably realized 
by a specific application term, is formalizable. Note that the proof-predicate for 
EMb contains avariable for b ; hence so does the soundness theorem. The  assertion 
about the function F follows easily from the fact that the complexity of the 
formulae f rA  can be estimated in terms of the complexity of A ; the fact that to 
show induction is realized we need induction only for formulae as complicated as 
[.rA ; the fact that we only need comprehension for formulae ]'rA to verify that it is 
realized for formulae A, and a bounded amount of complexity is introduced by the 
rules of inference. Details are left to the reader. 
Theorem 1.5.2 (formalized explicit definability for EM). (A) EMN proves part 
(A) of Theorem 1.4.2 as it stands. 
(B) For each fixed n, EM proves: 
If EM,  F=lx E NP(x)  then EM~<,)FP(t~) for some integer m, with F as in the 
previous lemma. Similarly, if EMb, F =Ix E NP(x)  then EMbFc,~FP(~)  for some 
integer rn. 
Proof. For (A), argue in EMN: Suppose EM F3xP(x); then use the formalized 
soundness theorem, Lemma 1.5.3, to produce a term t such that EM F P(t). For  (B), 
argue as follows in EM: Suppose EM. F3x E NP(x) .  Then, by Lemma 1.5.3, for 
some term t, EM~t,~ F t ~ N&P(t ) .  Then, by Lemma 1.5.2, since n is fixed, we can 
obtain in EM, that EM~o,~ F t = n~ for some m. Hence EM~c,,~ F P(N) .  Similarly for 
the other theories mentioned. 
We now turn to formalized explicit definability for EMN. 
Theorem 1.5.3. For each fixed n, EMN proves, if EMN, F Zlx E N P (x )  then 
EMNe~,,~FP(r~) for some integer m. Similarly, if EMNb, ,F3x  ~NP(x) ,  then 
EMNbm,~FP(r~) for some m. 
Proof. Like Theorem 1.5.2, except in the step from knowing EMNk F t E N& P(t) 
to knowing EMN, F t = m for some m. The replacement for Lemma 1.5.2 is 
lacking; that is, the argument for Theorem 1.3.1 with EM replaced by EMN,  
cannot be formalized in EM. Theorem 1.3.1 says that there is a model for EM on 
the set of normal terms. In order to define this model, we introduce sets C1 and E' 
by transfinite induction, as the least sets satisfying the closure conditions necessary 
to get comprehension, join, and tra'nsfinite induction satisfied. To  do the same for 
EMN,, we still seem to need transfinite induction, because of the clause corres- 
ponding to join: if A ~ CI and Vx E A f (x )E  CI, then j (A, f )E  CI and 
uEf (A , f )  iff 3x, y (u=(x ,y )&yEf (x )&xEA) .  
In turns out, however, that enough transfinite induction can be gotten from the 
join axiom to carry this construction out. Essentially, we need transfinite induction 
on a certain class of tree ordinals. The construction is rather intricate, and we have 
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decided not to present it here, in the interest of emphasizing the main techniques of 
the section and keeping the paper as short as possible, 
Remarks. Although it appeared initially that EMN was quite an important 
system, subsequent work ([12, 7]) has focussed attention on still weaker subsystems 
of EM; in particular, join has been shown to be unnecessary for formalizing most of 
mathematical practice [12]. 
1.6. Extending to elementary comprehension and choice 
In this section we indicate how the results of the previous ections (and hence the 
results of the entire paper) can be extended to cover the theories EMC and EMC § 
described in Section 0.3, which contain the comprehension axiom for all elementary 
formulae, and versions of the axiom of choice. The interplay of the axiom of choice 
and comprehension axioms is quite interesting, and before presenting our main 
results, we want to point out some of its features. 
In [11], Feferman shows that the axiom of choice ACx (which begins ~x 
X 3y  0(x, y ) . . . )  is consistent with EM. (He uses 1945-realizability.) However, if 
full comprehension is added, it becomes inconsistent, as Friedman has pointed out 
(in conversation): take ~(x, y ) to be x (x) $ -> x (x )~ y, and X = {x :::ly 0(x, y)}. If 
one wishes to consider the axiom of choice with comprehension, therefore, X must 
be somehow restricted. Here we conteht ourselves with the special cases ACrr as 
well as the general axiom AC. An interesting open question is to extend our results 
to the form of the axiom of choice in which X is a closed comprehension term of 
EMN, for instance. 
Our results for EMC depend on introducing a suitable variant of q-realizability 
which is sound for EMC.  A similar problem arises with the intuitionistic theory of 
species HAS, which also has a comprehension axiom; there Kreisel and Troelstra 
solved the problem [29, p. 203] by means of a realizability which associates to each 
species variable X another variable X*. Here we make use of the same idea; this 
definition also was anticipated in [11]. 
If u is the variable v~ in the list v~, v2 . . . .  of variables of EM, we write u* for 
v2,+1. If x is a list of variables, we write x* for the corresponding list of starred 
variables. We will define for each r whose variables (free and bound) have even 
subscripts, a formula e r r whose free variables are among e, x, x * where x are the 
free variables of 0. We shall leave implicit below this restriction on the variables of 
0, which is irrelevant as far as the soundness theorem for q-realizability and its 
consequences go. 
The clauses determining the formula e r r are as follows: 
f rx=y is x ~-y&x*=y* ,  
f r zEx  is (f,z,z*)Cx*, 
frCl(x) is Cl(x)&Cl(x*),  
fr App(f,x,y) is f(x)-~y &f*(x,x*)=-y * 
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The above clauses will apply also to the case of atomic formulae involving 
constants, provided we assign to each constant c an application term c * to be used  
in the above clauses. For instance, 
c ~ is )ta, a*{(w,  z, z *): w r ~(z,  a)},  
k* is Zx, x* ,y ,y*(x*) ,  
N* is VxNxN,  
p* is 2tx, x* ,y ,y*(px*y*) ,  
p~* is Az, z*(p~z*), i=1 ,2 .  
Rather than just give s*, we illustrate how we are thinking of these: we want 
s* xx * yy * zz * = (sxyz )* = (xz (yz ))* = (xz )* (yz, (yz )*) 
= (x*zz *)(yz, y*zz*)  = (x*zz*) (yz) (y *zz *); 
so we take 
s* = ax, x *, y, y *, z, z * (x*zz  *) (yz) (y *zz  *). 
Similarly, we take 
d* = Aa, a*, b, b *, x, x*, y, y* (da *b*x*y *), 
j* = A, A * , f , r  {((u, v), (x, y), (x*, y *)): (u, x ,x* )  ~ A *& 
(~, y, y *) ~ j'*(x, x*)}, 
which can be given by a term involving j and f*. We take O* to be O. 
We postpone giving i*; it is a little complicated. Here are the clauses giving the  
definition of fr 0 for compound formulae 0. 
f r3xA is 3x, x* ,u ,v (v=pux&A&urA) ,  
fr  VxA is Vx, x*(.f(x,x*) rA).  
The clauses for the propositional connectives are the same as before. 
The definition of c~ is not circular, because I~ is elementary, and so does not  
contain any constants cB for some other formula B, by condition (iii) in the  
definition of elementary. This completes the definition of q-realizability with x*  
We assign to each application term t an application term t* by the above clauses, in 
case t is a constant, and by the clause (ts)* is t*ss*, for compound application 
terms. 
Let us call an application term t self-realizing provided that there exist two 
application terms ], and q, such that EMNFx ~ t - * j , (x ) rx  ~ t with q,(x) substi- 
tuted for x* on the right, and EMNFurx  E t---~x E t. Which terms are self- 
realizing? The point of the question is that we need t to be self-realizing in order  
that the axiom of choice begining Vx E t 3y t~(x, y ) . . .  should be realized. We begin 
by observing that N is self-realizing, since we can take q, (x)= x and ] , (x)= 0, for  
instance. Let us call a formula 0 self-realizing provided there are two application 
terms j, and q, such that EMN F(~t(x)---~j~(x)rfJ(x)) with q~(x) substituted for x * 
on the right, and EMN F u r ~(x) ~ ~(x). In case ~ h as application terms, say t, in it, 
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we understand that t* is to be substituted on the right of the first clause. (A simple 
induction on the complexity of t shows that 
EMNF urx  ~ t - - -~(u ,x ,x*)~ t*, 
where t is any application term. Actually only the case of t built up from c~'s and N 
concerns us. We mention this to answer a possible objection about ambiguity in 
talking about u r 0(t).) We say the closed term t denotes a finite type if it is N or if it 
is s '  where s and r are finite types. 
Lemma 1.6.1. Let t be a closed term denoting a finite type. Then t is self-realizing. 
Remark.  At first it might seem that a much wider class of terms should be 
self-realizing. But if one tries to prove by induction that all negative formulae are 
self-realizing, one encounters ome difficulties, which lead one to believe that a 
"t ighter"  realizability interpretation would be required to prove this, and thereby 
extend our results beyond ACrr. 
Proof. Observe that if 0 is a self-realizing formula, then co is a self-realizing term. 
Let FT ' (x )  be the formula expressing that x is of type or; we shall prove by 
induction on the type cr that FT r is a self-realizing formula. We have already 
remarked this for the basis case of type zero; now consider the case of FT~"r 
which is written in full as 
Vz(FT" (z) --~ 3 b(FT' (b) & App (x, z, b))). 
We can then take 
j~o , , (x )  = ;tzXp (xz, q~,(xz ), 0)) 
qvr'~ ) = )tz, z * q~, (xz  ) 
A straightforward induction established the conditions for F'~ ~'r to be self- 
realizing. The lemma is proved. 
Theorem 1.6.1 (Soundness of q-realizability with x*). 
then for  some term t, EMC ___ ACFT F t rA. 
(ii) The same with EMN in place of EM. 
(i) I f  EMC • AC~ F A, 
Proof. We have to verify that the axioms and rules of EMC are realized. The 
propositional axioms and rules are verified just as for ordinary q-realizability. The 
quantifier axioms and rules need checking, but are left to the reader. The 
combinatorial axioms are also easily checked; we verify for instance 
App(f,  x, y)&App( J ,x ,  w)--* y = w. Suppose the hypothesis is realized and true; 
then f (x )  = y, f (x )~ w, f * (x ,x* )~-  y*, and f * (x ,x* ) -~ w*. Then, using the axiom 
in question, y = w and y*= w*; in other words, y = w is realized. The equality 
x 
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axioms and the rest of the combinatorial xioms are left to the reader. (Getting the 
right definition of the realizability is the hard part; there are, I assure you, several 
closely related incorrect definitions.) Next we turn to the comprehension axiom, 
3x(x  = ca(y, w)&vz(z E x nO(z, y, w))). 
We take X to be ca(y, W) and X* to be (ca(y, W))*; that is, c$(y, y *, W, W*). We 
need the observation that for any application terms t and s, t ~- s is a self-realizing 
formula. The rest of the verification follows from the definition of c *, if 0 has no 
application terms, and since we have the full comprehension axiom, this case 
suffices. 
Induction is verified as usual; and the reader will have no trouble checking that 
AC~ is realized, using Lemma 1.6.1. We leave the reader to verify the join axiom, 
and turn our attention to the inductive generation axiom. The verification of this 
axiom is fairly straightforward, but there are some tricky points, and we feel obliged 
to give the proof. Consider axiom V(i), which begins 3I(I = i(A, R ) . .  9 We have to 
produce I and I x, and some operation p such that 
p rVx ~ A (Vy((y, x ) E R --) y ~ I)--~ x E I). 
The idea is that I* = { (b, x, x * ) : b rx E I} where I = i(A, R ). We let ( x, x *, b, u ) be 
a realizer of x ~ I whenever brx ~ A, and x E A, and u is an operation such that 
VyVa((y,x )E R &ar (y ,x  )~ R--+(uyy*a)r (y ~ l)). 
In other words, we introduce/'* by transfinite induction as the least classification 
such that if (b ,x ,x* )@A*  and x~A,  and 
VyVy*Va((a,(y,x ) , (y* ,x* ) )E  R* &(y,x )~ R ---~(uyy*a, y )E l*), 
then ( (x ,x* ,b ,u ) ,x ,x* )~I* .  Then we take p=hx,  x*hbhu(x,x* ,b ,u) .  This 
takes care of axiom V(i), provided we note that I and I* depend uniformly on 
A,R ,A* ,  and R* 
In order to verify that axiom V(ii) is realized, first note that what is required is an 
operation e such that, with I and l* as above, whenever 
qrVx @ A (Vy((y, x ) E R --~ ~(y))---> 0(x)) 
and the formula which q realizes is true, and drx ~I ,  and x E l ,  then 
eqdxx*r O(x). By the recursion theorem, choose e so that 
eqdxx * = q (xx *) (p~p2 d)Ay, y ", p (eq (p~_p2 dyy *p )yy *)). 
(This formula is not meant o be comprehensible as it stands.) In order to explain it, 
let H(d)=p,p:d,  and F(p,d,y,y*)=p2p~dyy*p. Then check that H has the 
property that if x E I and drx E I then H(d) rxA. This is because H(d)  is the b 
such that d is (x, x *, b, u ), and if d rx ~ I then b rx ~ A, according to our work on 
axiom V(i) above. Now for F: if d rx E I, and p r ( y, x ) E R, and (y, x ) E R, then 
F(p, d, y, y*) ry E I. This is because F(p, d, y, y*) actually is uyy*p where d = 
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(x, x *, b, u ); then the property of F is given by the property which u must have in 
order that drx ~ I, according to our work on axiom V(i). Now the formula for e 
can be rewritten as 
eqdxx * = q (xx *) (H(d)) (Ay, y *, p eqF(p, d, y, y *)yy *). 
We still have to check that e has the property it is supposed to have. Suppose 
qr Vx ~ A (Vy((y, x)E  R ---) 0(y))--) t~(x)), 
and drx E 1, and x ~ I, and the formula which q realizes is true. We have to show 
that eqdxx * r 0(x). We prove this by transfinite induction on x. Actually, we have to 
prove a stronger statement by transfinite induction. We prove O(x) & eqdxx * r ~J(x) 
by transfinite induction. Assume that for all y E A with (y ,x )E  R, we have 
eqfyy*r 0(y) whenever f ry  E I, and y ~ I. We have that H(d) rx  E A, so 
q (xx *) (H(d)) r (Vy(( y, x } E R ~ 0(y )) ~ 0(x )). 
Also, F(p,d,y ,y*)ry  E I  whenever pr (y ,x )ER and (y ,x )ER;  hence, by the 
induction hypothesis, eqF(p, d, y, y*)yy * r O(y) whenever y E/ ,  (y, x ) E R, and 
pr (y ,x )ER.  Since yE I  follows from yEA and(y ,x )ER,  wehavethat  
Xy, y *, peqF(p, d, y, y *)r Vy ((y, x) E R ~ 0(y)). (2) 
Also 
Vy(( y, x ) E R --~ f~(y)), (3) 
by induction hypothesis. Hence, 0(x) follows, since the formula q realizes is true. 
Also, combining (1), (2), and (3), we have that eqdxx*r f~(x). This completes our 
transfinite induction, and thereby the proof that transfinite induction is realized; 
and with that, the proof of the theorem. 
Corollary. EM + CA and EMN + CA are closed under the rule corresponding to 
ACct. 
Proof. Suppose Vx E t3yA (x,y) is provable. Then, for some term q, it is 
provable that qr Vx E t 3yA (x, y), by the theorem. According to Lemma 1.6.1, t is 
a self-realizing term; that is, there are terms j, and q, such that x E t---~j, (x)rx E t 
(with q, (x) substituted for x*) is provable. Hence, 
x Et - - -~q(x,q, (x) , j , (x) ) r3yA (x,y) 
is provable. Let f(x ) = p2 q (x, q, (x ), j, (x )); and let g (x ) = p~ q (x, q, (x ), ], (x)). Then 
x E t ---~f(x) $ &g(x)  rA  (x , f (x) )&A (x,f(x)). 
Now g is superfluous; what matters is that x E t ~ f(x ) ~ & A (x, f(x )) is provable; 
this completes the proof of the corollary. 
Lemma 1.6.2. All the results of Section 1.3 on normal forms for terms apply as well 
to EM+ CA as to EM and EMN. 
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Proof. The only place CA enters is in extending the models from the combinator- 
ial part to CA hnd induction; here all that matters is that ~ be elementary. Of 
course, the lemma would not be true if AC were included, since AC is false 
(classically) in the models being considered. 
Theorem 1.6.2. The explicit definability Theorem 1.4.2 is valid with EM replaced 
by EMCa •  similarly for EMC, +-ACre- and EMCb __+AC~. 
Proof. For (A), use the soundness theorem 1.6.1; for (B), suppose EMC• 
ACrr tEN&P( t ) ;  then by Theorem 1.6.1, EM+CAf - t  EN,  hence by Lemma 
1.6.2, EM + CA f- t = rh for some integer m ; hence EMC - AC~ I- P(th ). Similarly 
for EMCb • AC~.  
Theorem 1.6.3. The formalized explicit definability theorem 1.5.2 is oalid for 
EMC • in place of EM. 
Proof. Just as in Section 1.5, we formalize the above arguments. Nothing new is 
involved. 
For the next theorem, and again in Section 3.2, we have use for a version of 
1945-realizability valid for the entire elementary comprehension axiom. In case the 
reader feels bewildered by proliferating notions of realizability, we pause to 
organize them. We have basically two kinds - -  1945-realizability and q- 
realizabiiity. The latter is distinguished by the clause ur3xAx iff u is a pair (x, p ) 
and Ax is true and prAx. (Of course some other clauses are modified also, but this 
is the one which enables us to get explicit-definability results using q-realizability). 
If one wishes these realizabilities to work for CA for all elementary formulae, one 
has to use the "X*  trick", in which urz EX  is (u ,z , z* )~X* .  This gives four 
formal realizabilities; then they can be interpreted in different models. We have 
given the most difficult of the four soundness proofs, that for q-realizability with the 
X*  trick. Since, in Section 3.2, we shall need 1945-realizability with the X'* trick, 
we state the definition, soundness theorem and an associated lemma, leaving the 
proofs to the reader. The definition is as follows: 
u rA  for A atomic is as for q-realizability with x*, 
ur 3xAx is 3x3x* 3p(u = (x,p )&pr Ax), 
urgxAx is u 
with the convention that x* occurs only if u tAx actually contains x* free. The 
other clauses are the same as for 1945-realizability. 
Theorem 1.6.4 (soundness of 1945-realizability with x *). I f  EMC + AC~r+ A then 
EM + CA~-trA for some term t. Similarly with EMN in place of EM. Also, Lemma 
1.6.1 holds for 1945-realizability with x*. 
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Proof. Left to reader. Note that we don't  need AC to get AC realized; this can 
never be done with q-realizabil ity. 
Theorem 1.6.5. k C~ and AC can be eliminated from proofs of formulae of the 
form FT ~ (t), where FT  r is a formula defining the type cr, and t is a closed term. That 
is, 
(i) EMC + AC~.-r is conservative over EM 4- CA for such formulae. In particular, if 
EMC + ACre I- t ~ N, then EM + CA t- t E N. 
(ii) EMC + ACFr is conservative over EM + CA + CT2 for such formulae. 
Proof. First we prove (i). Suppose EMC + AC~ F- FT ~ (t). Then for some conjunc- 
tion of instances of axioms of choice, say B, we have EM + CA I- (B ---> FT ~ (t)). By 
theorem 1.6.4, for some terms s and u, we have EM+CA~-sr(B--->FT"(t)) and 
EM + CA F- u rB. Hence EM + CA ~- s(u) r FT ~' (t). Hence by Lemma 1.6.1, EM + 
CAF-FT~(t) .  Now, to prove (ii), we use the same method,  but we need a 
replacement for the soundness theorem for realizability. Form the theory S by 
adding to EM + CA a new constant G and the axiom 
V/Vx,  y E N(f (x)  -= y <-~ 3 n (T(G (f), y, n) & Un = y )). 
Then we have the soundenss theorem, if EMC+ACFr+CT2,  then S F-trA, for 
some term t of S, as the reader can check. Then the argument we gave for (i) yields 
that if EMC + ACvr + CT2 I- FT" (t), then S I- FT ~ (t). However  S is conservative 
over EM + CA + CT2. This completes the proof. 
1.7. Church's rule 
Church's rule states, roughly, that every term which can be proved to be in N n 
can be proved to be recursive. More  precisely, Church's rule is 
CR~ from t E N n 
infer Vx~N3nEN(T(~,x ,n )&Un=tx) ,  fo rsomee.  
Although we shall make little use of Church's rule in our  investigations of 
continuity, closure under Church's rule is a traditional property of intuitionistic 
formal systems, and we can establish it easily from the work we have done already. 
Theorem 1.7. EM and other theories are closed under CRy. These "other theories" 
include EMN, EM + CA, and EMN + CA; moreover, AC may be used to prove the 
hypothesis of the rule, but isn't needed for the conclusion. 
Proof. Suppose EM ~- t E N n. Fix n such that EM~ F t ~ N n. Then for each integer 
x, EM~ ~-t~ E N. Let e be an index such that {e}(x)= m such that t~ standard 
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reduces to ha. (Standard reduction is a recursive process.) Then, arguing within EM, 
the results of Section 1.5 show that e is a total function and has the same values as t ; 
that is, the conclusion of CRI holds. EMN is treated similarly; the theories with CA 
are treated using the results of Section 1.6; the remark about AC follows from the 
fact that AC is conservative for statements of the form t U N N (Theorem 1.6.5). This 
completes the proof. 
Church's rule does find one application in our work: 
Corollary 1.7.1. Let X be an application term of EM such that EM + CA proves X 
is a complete separable metric space in standard form. Then the theories mentioned in 
the theorem are closed under the rule corresponding to ACx. 
Proof. I f  X were a term built up without | or i, then Corollary 1.6.1 would apply. 
A priori, however, there is the possibility that X involves j and i. We can use 
Church's rule to eliminate this possibility. X is the set of all f N N such that 
p (.f,, f,, ) < (1/n) + ( l /m), where p is a certain metric on the integers. Th us p is given 
by an application term provably in N~'2); by use of pairing functions, Church's rule 
applies to show that 0 can be taken to be recursive, in which case the term giving p 
will not contain j or i. Thus X is given by a pure comprehension term, and the 
metric on X, which is defined in terms of p, will not involve j or 1 either. 
There is also an extended version of Church's rule relevant o our investigations 
of continuity. If X is a complete separable metric space and Y is a separable metric 
space, we say the function f from X to Y is recursively continuous provided that it 
has a reeursive modulus of continuity, and that if xl . . . . .  x , , . . ,  is a base of X, the 
value f (x , )  can be calculated recursively to within e from n and e. (This generalizes 
notions in the literature for the case X = Nr~). 
Corollary 1.7.2. I f  EM proves t E C(X, Y) for some application term t, then EM 
proves t is recursively continuous. 
Proof. Immediate on applying Church's rule to the term giving the modulus of 
continuity of f and the term giving the value of f (x,)  to within e, depending on n 
and e. 
1.8. Uniform continuity and forcing 
The results of the preceding sections are sufficient o establish the derived rules 
concerning continuity, but not those concerning uniform continuity. Let X be a 
fixed compact metric space in standard form; what we need to know is that if the 
recursive functional {e} ~ (0) is provably defined for all a in X, then it is provably 
uniformly continuous. Of course, if it is provably defined in a classically true theory 
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to which our rules of continuity apply, it will be continuous, and hence, classically, 
uniformly continuous. But this is not good enough for establishing derived rules. 
Furthermore, there is such a functional which is provably defined for all recursive 
arguments a, but not uniformly continuous (see Section 2.7 for more discussion). 
This shows that some more delicate argument is called for. Our solution to the 
problem lies in using forcing to add a generic real to the universe; any function 
which is defined on all members of X, including generic ones, will surely be 
uniformly continuous. 
Let M, be the fixed sequence associated with the standard form of X, so that X 
consists of all sequences with y(n)<~M,. Let C be the set of finite sequences of 
integers p = pc~ . . . . .  p, such that p, ~M,  We use the usual notations (p)~ = p~ and 
lh(p) = n + 1; and we use the notation (borrowed from forcing) p ~< q to mean that 
q is an initial segment of p (so p contains more inlormation). We use ~ to denote 
the empty sequence. We use p,q, and r for members of C; thus Vp means VpEC. 
Let T be EM + CA or EMN + CA. Let Ta be the auxiliary theory with a constant 
for a member of X. We are going to assign to each formula A of Ta, a formula 
p IF A of T (without he constant a), which is read "p forces A ". The free variabJes 
of p IF A are p together with the free variables of A. 
Notations. p<-,q means p~<q and lh (p)=n+lh(q) ;  p, nIFA means 
Vq~p (q IFA). 
We are now ready to give the clauses defining p IF A. The following clauses are 
the same as for the usual notion of forcing: 
p IFA&B is p IFA&pIFB ,  
plf-A vB  i sp lFA  vp lFB,  
p IF 3xA is =lx(p IF A ). 
The following clauses are innovative; they are designed to "build in" uniform 
continuity. 
pIF(A ----~ B) is Vq<-p (q IFA ---~=In(q, n IF B)), 
p IFVxA is Vx3n (p, n IFA). 
We still have to give the clauses for atomic A. In order to do this, let x * be x if x is 
a variable; and we assign to each constant c an application term c *, to be described 
exactly below. Then we set (letting x, y, be variables or constants) 
plFx E y is Vq<~p((q,x*}~y*), 
p II- Cl(x) is Cl(x *), 
p lFx=y i sx*=y *, 
p II- App(x, y, z ) is x *(p, y *) ~ z *, 
p I~-App(a, x, y)  is N(x)&N(y)&x < lh(p)&(p), = y. 
To complete the definition, we have to assign to each constant c, an application 
term c*, to be used in the above clauses. First, we take N* to be {(p,n): n E 
N&p E C}; this is given by a certain term. (In other Words, any condition forces an 
integer to be an integer.) Next, we take 
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J" (e). if x < lhCo), 
a*(p: *) x 1 
t. undefined otherwise. 
Next, wetake c ~ --- {(p, x ): p It- I~(x)}; this appears to be circular, but it is not, since 0 
is elementary, and according to the definition of elementary, 0 doesn't contain any 
constants ca. Finally, we have to define c* for the combinatory constants c. We 
want the c* in this case to ignore the argument p, and do what c would do to the 
second argument. For instance, what should k* be? We want p It- kxy ~ x. That is, 
we want k* (p ,x* )=z*  and z* (p ,y* )~x* ,  for some z*. So we should take 
k*(p, x*, q, y *) --- x*. By similar reasoning, we see that we should take 
s*(p,x*,q,y*,r,z*)=(x*z*)(y*z*). 
Similarly for d and the pairing constants. We take j* to be 
AA, f{(p,(x*,y*)):p It-(x CA &y E f(x))}. 
This set is 
{(p,(x*,y*)):Vq<-p((q,x*}~ A *&(q,y*)~ f*(p,x*))}. 
If we define hp (q, x*) = f* (p, x*), then the set in question is 
{(p, (x *, y *)): 'r ((q, x*), (q, y *)} E j(A *, hp )}, 
so it can be formed using the join and comprehension axioms. We postpone giving 
i* until we get around to verifying that the inductive generation axiom is forced. 
The reader may now wish to glance at the statement of our soundness theorem, 
Theorem 1.8.1 below. Before we are ready to prove it, we need a few lemmas. 
Lemma 1.8.1. If p It- A and q <~ p, then q II- A. 
Proof. A simple induction on the complexity of A. 
Lemma 1.8.2. Ifp, jll-Aandp, mlt-(A--~B),thenforsomek, wehavep, klt-B. 
Proof. Let n = max(j, m); by Lemma 1.8.1, p, n II- A and p, n II- (A --~ B). So for 
each q ~<,p, q It- (A ~ B). Hence, for each q~,p, 3i(q, ill-B). Now there are only 
finitely many q<~np. Let k0 be larger than any of the values of i which work for 
these finitely many q. Then q<~,p--->q, koll-B. Set k = n + ko. Then p, k II-B. 
Lemma 1.8.3. IrA is an arithmetic formula, then EMN l- ((p It- A ) ~-~ A ) (with free 
variable p). 
Proof. A simple induction on the complexity of A, using the definition of N* and 
c* for combinatorial constants c. 
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Lemma 1.8.4. If we substitute y for the free variable x in the formula p I~- A (x), the 
result is provably equivalent to p LF A(y). 
Theorem 1.8.1. Let T be EM+CA or EMN+CA.  f f  TaFA, then 
T F : In ,N(0 ,  n I~- A). 
Proof. By induction on the length of the proof of A. We have to check the logical 
axioms and rules, then the non-logical axioms. Lemma 1.8.2 takes care of modus 
ponens, which is the most difficult of the propositional axioms; the rest of the 
propositional xioms and rules are left to the reader. Lemma 1.8.4 is needed for the 
quantifier axioms; with its help, the reader can check them. It is easy to verify the 
combinatorial xioms, once the constants c * are properly chosen; we have already 
indicated how to check the axiom for k. The others can be checked similarly. We 
check the comprehension axiom 
3X(X  -~ cA (y, W)& Vu(u ~ X ~-~ A (u, y, W))). 
Take X=c~(y ,W) .  Then (p ,u )EX~plP -A(u ,y ,W) ,  so 
Vu(u EX,~-~A(u,y, W)) is forced by 0. As to the first part of the axiom, if we 
define t* for application terms t by (ts)* = t*(s*), it is easy to check that p t~- st ~- s 
is equivalent to t*-----s*; this does it, for we have X*=X=cl (y ,W)  -- _ 
(cA (y, W))*. It is important to observe that p 1~- A is an elementary formula if A is. 
Using the definition of j*, the reader may verify the join axiom. We now turn to 
the (numerical) induction axiom of EMN. We claim 
0 IF (A (0) & V n(A (n) ~ A (n ')) ~ V nA ( n )). 
To check this, 'suppose p IF A (O)&'dn(A (n)-> A (n')). Prove by induction on n that 
3k(,p, k tFA(n)), using Lemma 1.8.2 at the induction step. 
We now turn to the inductive generation axioms IG. Fix A and R ; we have to 
give i*(A,R).  Let O be the relation defined by O(( r ,y ) , (p ,x ) )  iff r~  <
p & r II- (y, x ) E R. Let i*(A, R) be i(C x A, 0),  which is found uniformly in A and 
R. To verify that ~J forces axiom V(i), let 1 be i*(A,R); then as discussed in 
connection with the comprehension axiom, i (A ,R)=I  is forced. Now, a 
straightforward induction on i*(A, R ), using axiom V(ii) for induction on Q, shows 
that (p ,x)  E i*(A, R) implies 3n~,  n I~-x ~ i(A, R)). From this it easily follows that 
axiom V(i) is forced. Now, for axiom V(ii), suppose that 
p rF Vx CA (Vy((y, x ) ~ R ~ B (y))---~ B (x)). 
We wan t 3 n(p, n IF Vx ~i(A, R ) B (x)). Prove by induction on O th at for all (p, x } in 
I, 3k(p, k IF B(x)), which suffices. This completes the verification of the inductive 
generation axioms, and the proof of Theorem 1.8.1. 
The reason for introducing forcing was to obtain information about the uniform 
continuity of provably recursive functionals. A recursive functional is of the form 
{e} ~ (0); here a is a function, e.g. a member of X, and e is a recursive index. We say 
292 M.J. Beeson 
"m determines {e} ~ (0)" if the computation of {e}" (0) comes to a halt using only the 
first m values of the argument a, regardless of what a is. In other words, for all 
sequences xo,..., x,,-1, there is a terminating computation using the x~'s as values of 
a. Note that this can be expressed as an arithmetic sentence, i.e. it does not have a 
variable for a. 
Theorem 1.8.2. (i) (Uniform continuity of provably recursive functionals.) Let  T 
be as in the preceding theorem. Suppose Ta ~- {~}" (0) E N. Then for some integer m, 
T F- "n~ determines {~}" (0)'% 
(ii) (Formalized version.) For each fixed n, there is an n * such that the following is 
provable in T: If Ta~ ~- {~ }" (0) E N, the n for some m, T~. ~- "ra determines {~ }" (0)". 
Proof. Suppose Ta~-{~}'(0) EN. Then, according to Theorem 1.8.1, 
TI-3k(~, k I~-{~}'(0)~N). Argue in T for the moment: each q of length k forces 
{e}" (0) ~ N; that is, each q <~k ~ forces 31" (j is a terminating computation of {e }" (0)). 
(In particular, the values a(i) used in the computation j have i </'). Let  m be the 
supremum of these j's, taken over the finitely many q of length k. Then every 
condition of length k forces 3j<~m (I" is a terminating computation of {~}'(0)). 
Hence 0, k I~-"m determines {~}'(0)". We have been arguing in T; so we have 
proved T I-3m, k (~, k I~-"m determines {~}'(0)". According to Lemma 1.8.3, the 
formula "m determines {~}'(0)" is equivalent to its forcing interpretation; thus 
T~-3m. ("m determines {~'(0)"). To finish the proof, we apply numerical explicit 
definability for T. 
In order to obtain the formalized version of this theorem, we need only use the 
formalized version of numerical explicit definability, together with a formalized 
version of Theorem 1.8.1. After the work of Section 1.5, the reader should have no 
difficulty filling in the details. 
Corollary. Suppose Ta ~- 1~}" (0) E N. Then for some integer k, T f- {~}" (0) </~. 
Proof. Let m be as in the theorem. Then there are finitely many sequences p of 
length m, such that the value of {e}'(0) is (provably) one of the values determined 
by using p to give the input values a(i) called for in the computation. Let  k be the 
supremum of these values. This argument can be directly formalized in T; but to get 
k a numeral, we have to make one more appeal to explicit definability. This 
completes the proof. 
Remarks. Theorems 1.8.1 and 1.8.2 are stated for EM + CA and not for EM; this 
is because p I~- A generally has existential quantifiers even if A does not, so it seems 
we need CA to get even the comprehension axiom of EM forced. This difficulty can 
be gotten around as follows: Show that if EMa ~- A,  then 
EM ~- 3u, p, n(u r (p, n IJ- A)). The point is that u rB i~ always "almost-negative",  i.e. 
of the kind allowed in the comprehension axiom of EM. The proof of Theorem 
1.8.2 will carry over to this hybrid interpretation. We do not carry out the details. 
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In order to apply the above theorem, we need to know that the hypothesis is 
sometimes satisfied. Realizability will often give us a term t such that F t E N. The 
following theorem connects these two situations. 
Theorem 1.8.3. Suppose Ta F t ~ N, where t is an application term. Then, for some 
integer e, TaF t ~- {~}'(0). 
Proof. Suppose Ta F t E N. We define the integer e by giving instructions for the 
computation of {e }" (0). To compute {e }" (0), try to compute Val, (x) for successively 
longer initial segments x of a, simultaneously taking a longer and longer time in 
attempting the computation of the normal form. (Trying all possible reductions is a 
recursive process; note that we do not restrict ourselves to so-called "standard 
reductions" proceeding in a pre-specified order. By Church-Rosser, we get the 
same normal form from any successful reduction.)By Lemma 1.3.5, TaF ({~}'(0) 
defined --* t -~ {~}'(0)). So the problem is to show that if TaFt  E N, then Ta proves 
that for some initial segment x of a, Val, (x) is defined. Suppose Ta F t E N. Then 
Ta proves 0, n IF =ly (y --- t &y E N), for some n. We want to conclude, in Ta, that if 
x is an initial segment of a of length n, then Val, (x) is defined. If x is an initial 
segment of a of length n, then for some y, x IF (y ~ t & y E N); since x IF y ~ N, we 
know Valy (x) is a numeral. So we only have to prove that if x IF y ~ t, then 
Val, (x )= Valy (x). This is an easy induction on the complexity of y and t. This 
completes the proof of Theorem 1.8.3. 
Remarks on forcing and Beth models. In Section 1.3, we suggested a proof of 
Theorem 1.8.2 by Beth models. It would take us too far afield to define what is 
meant by a Beth model; see [30] for instance. Suffice it to say that a Beth model of 
Ta can be constructed along the lines suggested in Section 1.3. Satisfaction irt this 
model, say c~l~-B 0, can be expressed by a formula of T, for each fixed formula 0 of 
Ta, with a variable c~. There is then a beautiful connection between Beth models 
and forcing: For each 0, 
((~ IF~ 0) ~ 3 n (4,  n IF 0)) 
is provable in T. (Here 0 contains terms t which are interpreted on the left as 
constants in the model, and on the right as application terms.) There are many 
details to check, especially in the case of atomic 0. 
2. DERIVED RULES OF INFERENCE 
In this section we show how to obtain derived rules of inference related to 
continuity, uniform continuity, and principles of continuous choice. The proofs will 
be based on certain properties of the systems EM and EMN which were established 
in Section 1. In the future, one may wish to verify these rules for other systems, and 
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we want to make it clear that they depend only on certain rather general properties 
of the systems, and not on the specific details of Feferman's formulation. Indeed, in 
[4] we establish these rules for Friedman and Myhill's set-theoretic approach to 
constructivity; and we want to arrange the material so that in [4] we only have to 
check the basic properties of the systems, and not repeat he work of this section. 
The first object of this section is therefore to state precisely the conditons on a 
system which we use. Throughout this section, we assume that (X, P) is a provably 
complete separable metric space in standard form, and that (Y, ~r) is a provable 
separable space. (We leave it to the context o determine in which theory these facts 
are to be provable.) If T is any theory capable of talking about N r~ (which it must be 
to discuss any complete separable spaces), then it makes sense to form the auxiliary 
theories Ta and Tb as we did for EM in Section 1. We now state the first two of the 
three conditions. These two are sufficient for all the results not mentioning uniform 
continuity. 
(i) (Formalized numerical explicit definability). If T "  3nP(b,  n) then for some 
numeral fi, T F P(b, t~). Furthermore, if Tb is replaced by one of the subsystems Tbk 
as in (ii) below, then this statement is provable in T, for each fixed k and P. 
(ii) (Reflection Principles). There is a sequence T, of subtheories of T, such that 
every theorem of T is a theorem of some T,, and, if Pr, is the provability predicate 
of T,, then T F Pr. ('A')---~ A for each fixed n and A. 
We also need a reflection principle for Tb. Let Prf, (b, k, 'A (b)') be the predicate 
"k is a proof of A (b) in Tb," .  Note that this is formulated in T, with a variable b. 
Then we require 
T F Prf,, (b, k, 'A (b)')& # (k) = b(k )& w U X & b ~ X---~ A (w ), 
for each fixed n and A. The significance of k is that (by the usual properties of 
GSdel numbers) it is an upper bound to the j's, such that some axiom b(l)  = nq is 
used in the proof k of A (b). 
We now turn to the conditions needed to establish the results on uniform 
continuity. These involve the auxiliary theory Ta and are a little more difficult to 
state in complete generality. One way to state them is as follows: 
(i)' If Ta F 3nP(n) then for some numeral ~, Ta F ({g)'(0) E N&P({t~}"(0))). 
Furthermore, if Ta is replaced by Ta., then this statement is provable in T, for each 
fixed n and P. 
(ii)' If Pra. is the provability predicate for Ta (which is formulated in T, with a 
free variable a), then 
T F a E X &Pra. ('A (a)')-* A (a). 
(iii) If T b {~}'(0) E N, then for s~me numeral n5, T F"nq determines {if}'(0)". 
Here "m determines {e}'(O)" means that for all sequences x0 . . . .  , x,,_~ of possible 
values for a (0), ..., a (m - 1), the computation of {e }"(0) converges without asking 
for any other values of a. Note that this is a formula of arithmetic, i.e. doesn't 
contain a variable a in spite of appearances. 
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In this form, the conditions apply directly to the theories of Friedman and Myhill, 
which we study in [6]; and we also have verified them in Section 1 for Feferman's 
theories. Actually, it would suffice to have any system of terms t(a) to replace the 
canonical terms {e}*(0); as long as we can prove explicit definability (i)' and uniform 
continuity (iii) for the same system of terms. For instance, we could use the 
application terms of EM. 
Within the context of Feferman's theories, then, our results apply to EM, EMN, 
EMC, EMC+; and to these theories one may add Markov's principle and/or the 
schema T I (<)  for various provably linear orderings <,  or even for all true 
primitive recursive well-orderings. In Section 1 we have established the necessary 
properties of these theories except for MP and TI; there is nothing new for these 
from the number-theoretic case, and they are left to the reader. We generally state 
the theorems for "EM and other theories"; this phrase is to be understood as 
above. In particular, the rules do not hold when Church's thesis is present, as will be 
discussed in Section 2.7. 
2.1. The principle of local continuity 
Suppose, for real x and integers m, we can constructively prove Vx3mA (x, m), 
where A is a provably extensional predicate. What can we assert about the means 
of producing m from x ? Continuity is too much to ask, as the examples how: 
A(x ,m) :  (m=O&x<l )v (m=l&x>O) ,  
B(x ,m):  m <~x. 
However, these examples suggest that, given x, we may be able to find m 
continuously on some neighborhood of x. This turns out to be a very fruitful idea; it 
leads immediately to the following principle: 
LC(C,N): H & Va EX3rn  ENP(a,m)---> 
Va E X 3nbhd N(a)3m Vz E N(a)P(z ,m ). 
Here H is the hypothesis, which expresses that X is a complete separable metric 
space, Y is a separable metric space, and P is extensional, i.e. 
Vz, b, m(P(z, m)&b ~ z ~ P(b, m)). More generally, we can consider versions of 
the principle of local continuity applying to two metric spaces X and Y, instead of 
X and N. It turns out that X has to be complete for this notion to be useful, but Y 
only has to be separable. In this context, "P extensional" abbreviates 
Va, b ~XVu,  v ~ Y (P(a, u )& a -xb  & u -~,v--> P(b,v)). 
The hypothesis H of all the versions of the principle of local continuity we consider 
will include this formula as well as the hypothesis on X and Y. The principle of 
local continuity should state that if Va E X 3b ~ YP(a, b), then for each a in X we 
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can find a "stable" solution b to the problem P(a, b). The most natural definition of 
"stable" seems to be the following: b is stable (for a)  iff 
Ve < 0 38 > 0Vce N~ (a)3de N~ (b)P(c, d). 
One version of the principle of local continuity would then be: 
SLC+(X, Y): H&VaeX3beYP(a,b) - -+VaeX3beY(P(a ,  b)&b isstable). 
We cannot prove anything about SLC § without additional restrictions on Y and P 
(and for this reason SLC + won't be mentioned again). The restriction we have to 
make is that Y be complete and for each a in x, {b : P(a, b)} be a closed subset of 
I,'. Then we formulate (including the hypothesis that Y be complete in the 
formula H)  
LC§ Y): H & VaeX{b :P(a, b)} is closed in Y 
& VaeX 3beYP(a, b)---~ VaeX 3beY(P(a, b) & b is stable). 
Here  P is any formula of EM. As a matter of fact, in all the mathematical 
applications we can think of, the restriction on P is satisfied; thus from the point of 
view of mathematical practice, LC § is as powerful as S LC § Our plan is to prove 
things about LC § by reducing LC + to a slightly different version of the principle of 
local continuity called LC(X, Y), which in turn can be reduced to LC(X, N). Finally 
we analyze the metamathematics of LC(X,N) directly. 
In order to state the form LC(X, Y) of the principle of loc.al continuity, we 
introduce the notion of an e-stable solution to the problem P(a, b). We say b is 
e-stable (for a)  if[ 38>0 Vc~N~ 3dEN, (b)P (c ,d ) .  Thus b is stable iff b is 
e-stable for every e > 0. We then formulate 
LC(X, Y): H&Va~X3b~YP(a ,b ) - - - -~VaEXVe>O3bEY 
(P(a, b) & b is e-stable) (any formula P). 
Here  {b: P(a, b)} is not required to be closed, but the conclusion is weaker than the 
conclusion of LC +. We are going to derive LC + from LC; the following lemma will 
be needed: 
Lemma 2.1.1. Let X and Y be as above, and let P be extensional, but otherwise 
unrestricted. Fix a ~ X. Suppose for each n, b, is e,-stable, where e, approaches zero 
as n ~ % and suppose b, converges to b. Then b is stable. 
Proof. It suffices to show b is e-stable for every e > 0. Fix an e. Let n be so large 
that e. < e/2 and also b. is within e/2 of b. Let 8 be such that if c ~ N6 (a) there is d 
in N,. (b,) with P(c, d): 8 exists since b, is e,-stable. We claim that if c ~N~ (a), 
there is e in N. (b) with P(c, e). Namely, take e = d. Hence b is e-stable, for every 
e ; hence stable. 
Lemma 2.1.2. LC(X, Y) implies LC+(X, Y) in EM+ACN.  
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Proof. Suppose VaEX 3b E YP(a, b), and that P satisfies the conditions for 
LC +. Suppose LC(X, Y) holds and fix a ~ X. We have to produce a stable solution 
b such that P(a,b). Let e,, =2-" ;  we will produce a sequence b, such that b,, is 
e.-stable, and b, converges to b. Then, because {b : P(a, b)} is closed, b will be a 
solution, i.e. P(a, b); and by Lemma 2.1.1, b will be stable; b will exist by the 
completeness of Y. 
We have to construct he sequence b.. Choose bo by LC(X, Y) so that bo is 
1-stable (for a ). .Consider the new problem P, defined by 
P,(x, b )*--~ P(x, b) & (x E Ns,2(a)--~ b ~ N,(b,)), 
where 8 is such that c~N~(a)--*3bEN~(bo)P(c,b). Then we have u 
~b~ YP1 (x, b), since either x E N~ (a) or x is outside N~/2(a). Hence, by LC(X, Y), 
we can find b, which is 1/2-stable (with respect o problem P~); but then bt is also 
1/2-stable with respect o P. Furthermore b~ is within 1 of b0. Continuing in this 
way, we can find b,,+~ so that b,.~ is within e,, of b,, and b.+l is an e,+~-stable solution 
of the problem P(a, b). To be more precise, consider 
P.§ (x, b) .-, P(x, b )&(x ~ N,,2(a )--, b ~ N.. (b. )), 
where 6 is such that c ~ N~ (a )~ 3b~N, .  (b,,)P(c, b); 6 exists if b,, is e,,-stable. 
Then we have Vx~X3b ~ YP,,+~(x, b), so we can find b,+l which is an e,+rstable 
solution within e, of b,,. 
There is a technical difficulty at this point; we need an axiom of choice to get the 
existence of the whole sequence b,. Actually ACN will suffice: the above argument 
shows that 
Vn3bo,...,  b, Vk ~< n(P(a, b~)&b is ek-stable 
& bk E N,~_, (bk-t)). 
Hence, by ACre, there is an operation which produces the finite sequence bo,..., b, 
from n; hence the sequence b, itself exists. Hence, by the completeness of Y, the 
sequence has a limit b. By Lemma 2.1.1, b is stable; this completes the proof. 
We shaI1 also consider derived rules of inference corresponding to the principles 
of local continuity we have formulated, in which the conclusion of the rule is to be 
inferred from the hypothesis. To be explicit, these rules are: 
LCR(X ,N) :  from Va E X3m ENP(a ,m)  and H 
infer Va ~ XB6 >03m ~ NVz EN,(a)P(z ,m),  
LCR(X, Y): from Va E X Bb ~ YP(a, b) and H 
infer VaEXVe >03bE Y(P (a ,b )&b is e-stable) 
LCR+(X,Y) :  f romVaEX3bEYP(a ,b )  and H 
and Va ~ X{b : P(a, b)} is closed in Y 
infer Va ~ X 3b E Y (P(a,b) & b stable). 
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We now show how to reduce LC(X, Y) to LC(X, N); then prove closure under 
LCR(X, Y); then finally prove closure under LCR+ (X, Y) by essentially reducing it 
to LCR(X, Y) as in Lemma 2.1.2. The details of this last proof will be clearer after 
the proof of closure under LC(X,N); that is why we postpone it. 
Lemma 2.1.3. LC(X, Y) follows from LC(X,N) in EMN. If T is a theory 
containing EMN and T is closed under LCR(X,N) then T is closed under 
LCR(X, Y). 
Proof. Suppose LC(X,N) and YaEX3b ~ YP(a,b), and fix a EX  and e >0. 
Since Y is separable there is a countable sequence of points yl . . . .  , y,,. 9 9 of Y, such 
that every point of Y is within e of some y, Let U, be the sphere of radius e about 
y,. Consider the formula Va~X3nt3b~ U,,P(a,b), which is in the form 
YaEX3mB(a ,m)  with B(a,m) the formula 3bUU,.P(a,b). Since P is exten- 
sional, so is B. Hence we can apply LC(X,N) to Va~X3mB(a,  m). The result is 
the conclusion of the instance of LC(X, Y) we were trying to prove. This argument 
can be formalized in EMN. The assertion about LCR follows similarly: If T proves 
VaEX3bEYP(a ,b ) ,  then T proves VaEX3mB(a,m) ;  by closure under 
LCR(X, N) it proves the desired conclusion. 
Theorem 2.1.1. EM and other theories (see above) are closed under the rule of local 
continuity LCR(X, Y). 
Proof. By Lemma 2.1.3, it suffices to check closure under LCR(X,N).  Suppose 
EM~-u  We begin by showing that the conclusion of 
LCR(X, N) is true; then later show that it is provable in EM. Fix b ~ X (here X is 
the metric space, not the formula). Form the theory EMb as described in Section 
0.3. Since EMb contains the axiom bE  X, we have EMb~-3mCNP(b,m). By 
Theorem 1.4.2, EMb has the numerical explicit definability property. Hence, for 
some m, EMb ~-P(b, r~). Now, the proof of P(b, nq) in EMb makes use of only 
finitely many axioms of EMb; in particular, there is an integer k such that if b(]-) = g 
is an axiom used in the proof, then ] < k. Thus P(b, n~) will be true whenever b is 
interpreted as some element of X agreeing with b on its first k value. If X is N" or 
2 N we have shown the conclusion of LCR(X,N) to be true; but if X is a general 
complete separable metric space in standard form, we have to make a slight further 
argument. Let N(b) be the sphere of radius 1/k centered at b. Lemma 0.2 provides, 
for w in N(b), some z with w - z and zi = b~ for i = 1,2 . . . . .  k. Hence P(b, ffz) is 
t rue  when b is interpreted as z. By the extensionality of P, P(b, r~ ) is also true when 
b is interpreted as w. Hence V w ~N (b)P(w, r~) is true. This is the conclusion of 
LCR(X,N). 
We now turn to the problem of getting the conclusion of LCR(X,N) to be 
provable in EM instead of only true. The idea is to formalize the above argument in 
EM. This cannot be done directly; however, we make use of the theories EM,  of 
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Section 1.5. Suppose EMFVa~X3rn  ~NP(a ,m) .  Then for some n, 
EM,, F VaEX3m E N P(a, m). Since provable sentences are provably provable, 
we have this conclusion also in EM. Now argue in EM as follows: Fix b ~ X. Form 
EMb,  ; then EMb, F ::tin ~N P(b, m); by Theorem 1.5.2 (and increasing n slightly) 
we have EMb, }- P(b, ~)  for some rn. Let k be such that Prf, (b, k', P(b, t~)'); then 
applying Theorem 1.5.1 on the reflection principle for EMb,, we obtain ~(k)= 
b(k)-+ P(w, r~ ). The rest of the proof can be directly formalized. This completes 
the proof of closure under LCR(X, N) for EM. 
We next give three examples to complement the previous theorem. Two are 
examples in which the hypothesis of LCR is provable, but the conclusion is false, 
because the space X is not complete. 
Example 1. Let X be the rationals, Y the integers, and let P(a, b) be b = sign (a). 
Example 2. Let X be the space of C ~t~ functions from [0, 1] to R, equipped with 
the C t~ metric induced by the sup norm. Let Y be the space of C t'~ functions 
equipped with the C ~1~ metric induced by the norm Ilfll 1= sup(lf(x)l, If'(x)l). Let 
P(a, b) be the relation a - b of extensional equality (which is the same in either 
metric.) Then clearly Va~X3b E YP(a, b) is provable (take b = a), but b cannot 
be found continuously in any neighborhood of the identically zero function. In fact, 
any neighborhood of the identically zero function contains a function with 
arbitrarily large C tt~ norm. 
Example 3 (Martin Hyland). Let C be the complex numbers. Then VzEC3w 
(w 2 = z). But, we cannot find a continuous function g such that (g (z))2 = z, even on 
a small neighborhood of z = 0. This example shows that the version of local 
continuity we have given cannot be strengthened byrequiring a function to produce 
the "perturbed" solutions. 
Theorem 2.1.2. EM and other theories are closed under the rule of local continuity 
LCR § (X, Y). 
Remark.  The proof goes by reduction to the rule LCR(X, Y); we actually use only 
closure under LCR(X, Y), closure under the rule corresponding to ACN, the 
existence of reflection principles for subsystems, and formalized explicit 
definability. 
Proof. Suppose that T proves H&ga~X{b:P(a ,b )}  is closed, and T proves 
Va~X3bEYP(a ,b ) .  We have to show T proves VaEXBbEY(P(a ,b )&b 
stable). Consider the theory with an added constant a for an element of X ;  this 
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theory was called Tb in Section 0.3; here we call it T*. It suffices to show that T* 
proves 3b ~ Y (P(a, b)&b stable). Fix an integer M so that T~ (whose formulae 
have complexity bounded by M) proves H &{b : P(a, b)} is closed and T~ proves 
::lb E YP(a, b). Let us also assume that M is large enough that various elementary 
theorems of EMN are provable in EMNM. We will then show (within T), for each n, 
T*~ proves 
::lbo . . . .  ,b.Vk <-n(P(a;bk)&bk is s~-stable &bk EN .... (b~-,)). (*) 
Here e~ = 2 -~. 
In order to prove (*), we adopt the terminology used in the proof of Lemma 
2.1.2. Since TM proves VaEXrtb ~ YP(a, b), and TM is closed under LC(X, Y), 
and satisfies formalized explicit definability theorems, there is some term of T*, say 
b0 (involving the constant a), such that T*I proves P(a, bo)& b, is 1-stable. Form the 
problem P1 as in Lemma 2.1.2; applying closure under LC(X, Y) again, we obtain a 
term bl of T~ such that T~ proves b~ is 1/2-stable and within 1/2 of bo. For any 
integer n, we can make n applications of LC(X, Y) in this way to obtain terms 
bo . . . .  , b, such that each bk is an e~-stable solution to P(a, bk ), and bk§ is within ek 
of bk. But this is just (*). 
Now, apply the reflection principle for T*, which is provable in T*, to the 
formula (*).  The result is that T* proves, 
Vn 3bo . . . .  , b, Vk ~< n (P(a, bk) & bk is sk-stable & bk ~ N,~_~(b~ - 1)). 
Now apply closure under ACN to obtain in T* the existence of the sequence b,. 
Then the proof is finished by Lemma 2.1.1, which is provable in EMN. 
2.2. Local uniform continuity 
In this section, we suppose X is (provably) a compact metric space, in standard 
form for compact spaces (see Section 0.2), and P and Y are as in the previous 
section. We show that in this case, a uniform lower bound on the size of the 
neighborhood Ns (a) involved in the principle of local continuity can be found. 
Precisely, we formulate the rules of local uniform continuity as follows: 
LUCR(X, Y): from Va ~X3b E YP(a,b) 
infer Ve >036>OVa EX3b ~ Y 
Vc ~ N~ (a)3d e N, (b)(P(a, b) & P(c, d)). 
The special case Y = N can be equivalently written in the form 
LUCR(X,N) :  f romVaEX~b~NP(a ,b )  
infer 36 >0Va E X3n ~NVc E N~(a)P(c, n). 
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The reader will find it instructive to verify that this uniform lower bound 8 exists in 
the examples given in Section 2.1 to motivate the principle of local continuity. 
The rule LUCR + is a little tricky to formulate properly. We want to say that 8 
depends only on e, not on a, and the solution b depends only on a, not on e. This 
can't be expressed with a linear string of quantifiers. In order to express it, we have 
to introduce operations B(a) and A (e) to produce b and 8, respectively. But then, 
we have included some principles of choice, and said more than we intended to say. 
In fact, closure under this stronger ule can be proved from closure under LUCR, 
much as closure under LCR § is derived from closure under LCR, with additional 
appeal to the rule corresponding to AC § However, it turns out that LUCR suffices 
for our metamathematical applications, and LCR § suffices for the mathematical 
applications. For simplicity, we therefore omit discussion of LUCR +. 
Lemma 2.2. If a theory T containing EMN is closed under LUCR(X,  N) then it is 
closed under LUCR(X, Y). 
Proof. Like Lemma 2.1.3. 
Theorem 2.2. EM and other theories are closed under LUCR(X,  Y). 
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, it suffices to consider LUCR(X, N). Our proof is similar to 
the proof of closure under LCR(X, N), but will make use of the theory EMa instead 
of EMb. 
Suppose EM I-Ya ~ X3  n E N P(a, n). We first prove informally that the conclu- 
sion of the rule is true. Note that EMaF3n~NP(a ,  n). Now since EMa has no 
axioms about the values of a, it doesn't have the numerical explicit definability 
property; but it does have the explicit definability by terms property, as in 1.4.2 (A). 
Hence, for some closed term t of EMa, (or, by Theorem 1.8.3, some term {~}" (0), if 
we want to make sure only conditions (i)-(iii) are used in the proof), we have 
EMaFP(a , t )&tEN.  Let m be the integer provided by Theorem 1.8.2 so that 
EMa F lh(x) i> n~ ~ Val, (x) $. Take 8 = 1/m. Let a E X, and let n be the value of t 
when a is interpreted as a. More precisely, n = Val, (4 (m)), which is defined. Since 
P(a, t) is true for all interpretations of a as a member of X, we have P(a, n). Now let 
c E N~ (a); we have to show P(c, n). By Lemma 0.2, since p(a, c)< 1/m, we can 
find d E X such that d - c and d 1 = al for j = 1,2 . . . . .  m. Hence Val , (d(m))  = 
Val , (~(rn))= n, i.e. P(d,n). But P is extensional, hence P(c,n). Hence the 
conclusion of LUCR(X,  N) is true. 
Now, in order to get the conclusion provable in EM, we have to formalize the 
argument. As usual, we fix j such that EMa/F 3riP(a, n); then, using the formalized 
version of Theorem 1.8.2, we get in EM that EMj~- lh(x)~>n~oVal , (x)~,  
(perhaps increasing j). Then finish the proof as before, using the reflection principle 
for EMai for the part following the definition of 8. 
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2.3. An application: Uniform convergence 
The results of this section answer a question of Professor Greenleaf. Suppose 
that uniformly continuous functions f. from [0, 1] to R converge pointwise to the 
identically zero function 0. Is the convergence necessarily uniform? Classically, the 
answer is no, since we can take f, to be a spike of height 1 on the interval [0, 1/n] 
and 0 elsewhere. But the proof that this sequence converges pointwise t~ses the 
decidability of order in the reals. We therefore consider the principle 
PC(Anf, )---> UC(Anf. ) which asserts that pointwise convergence implies uniform 
convergence. Note that technically a uniformly continuous function is a pair (f, to) 
with to a modulus of continuity for f. PC(Anf,) is Vx~I3w ENQMOD(x,w) ,  
where I is [0, 1], Q is the positive rationals, and MOD(x, y ) expresses that w is a 
modulus of convergence at x for Znf,; that is, Ve~QVn>~w(e)lfo(x)l< e. 
UC(Anf, ) asserts that there is a modulus W of uniform convergence, i.e., 
UC(Anf, ) is 3WVe e Q VxEIVn >I W(e)lf~ (x)[ < e, 
Theorem 2.3. EM and other theories are closed under the rule, from PC(Af, ) and 
" f .  uniformly continuous from I to R"  infer UC(Anf.). 
Proof. We use closure under the rule of local uniform continuity and under the 
rute corresponding to ACre. The space N Q, where Q is the positive rationals, is given 
the product metric p, which depends on some fixed listing of the members of Q. 
Two members of this space are thus close together if they agree on a long initial 
segment of this listing. If t- PC(Anf. ), i.e. VxE I3w E N~ w), we can apply 
the rule of local uniform continuity to obtain (in EM) for each positive rational 7/, a 
positive rational 8 such that 
Vx ~ I3  w E N ~ Vy ~Na (x) 3 w' E N a (MOD (x, w ) & MOD (y, w ') & p (w, w ') < 71 ). 
(.) 
Given e > 0, let 71 > 0 be such that two members of N Q within ~7 of each other must 
agree on e. Let 3 be such that (*)  holds. Let x t , . . . , x ,  be such that each x ~ I is 
within 8 of some x~. Let w~ EN Q be as in (*),  with x = x,. Let N, = max,,,  w~(e). 
Then (in EM) we have Vk>N. tfk(x)l.<s. We would be done now if N were 
obtained from e by means of an operation; to get this, we apply closure under the 
rule corresponding to ACN, which suffices since e is rational. This completes the 
proof. 
Remarks. We shall see in the appropriate sections that Church's thesis contradicts 
PC--->UC, but that PC--->UC is consistent with EM. This makes the analogy 
complete between the principle PC---->UC and the principle that continuous 
functions are uniformly continuous. 
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2.4. Rule of continuous choice 
Here X is a (provably) complete separable metric space so that (by Corollary 
1.7.1) various theories are closed under the rule corresponding to ACx (See 
Remark (ii) below). Y and P are as before. C(X, Y) is the locally uniformly 
continuous functions from X to Y; that is, the functions which are continuous on 
compact sets. As C(X, Y) must be formalized in EM, each member of C(X, Y) 
carries along an operation which produces from each compact subset of X a 
modulus of uniform continuity on the compact subset. As Bishop has made clear, 
these are the functions which are useful from a constructive point of view. By the 
rule of continuous choice, we mean the rule 
CC(X, Y) from VaeX3!b  e YP(a,b) 
infer 3feC(X ,  Y)VaEXP(a, f (a)) .  
Here 3!b~ YP(a, b) abbreviates 3be  Y (P(a, b )&Vce  Y(P(a, c)--* b ~ c)), in 
other words 3! means extensional uniqueness. 
Theorem 2.4. EM and other theories are closed under the rule of continuous choice. 
The same is true for any theory closed under the rule of local uniform continuity and 
the rule corresponding to ACx. 
Proof. Suppose EMFVa: : I !be  YP(a,b). Then, by the rule corresponding 
to ACx, there is an application term t for which EMFVaeX 
P(a, ta). Now, because of the uniqueness hypothesis, t is provably extensional. 
More precisely, EM F a-xa'---~ ta--~.ta'. To see this, argue as follows in EM: We 
have P(a, ta) and P(a, ta'); since a - a '  and P is extensional, we have P(a, ta'), but 
3!bP(a,b), so ta ~ ta'. Thus the predicate A(a,b) given by b--yta is provably 
extensional. To see this, let a - a '  and b - b' and b ~ ta. Then b ~ ta', so b '~ ta'. 
Now we claim that t is not only extensional, but locally uniformly continuous. Let 
X '  be a compact subset of X. Then EMFVzeX '3beYA(z ,b ) .  Since A is 
provably extensional, we can apply the rule of local uniform continuity to obtain 
EMFVe>036>0VaeX'3beYVc  e N~ (a)fq X '3dE  Y (,) 
(a(a, b )&A (c, d)&o'(b, d) < e). 
By closure under the rule corresponding to ACN, we have (provably in EM) an 
operation D such that D(e) is 6 as in this formula. (Recall that e and e are 
rationals.) We claim that D is a modulus of uniform continuity for t. Let a and c be 
in X with p (a ,c )< 6 = D(e). Then, according to (*), 
3b, de  Y (A  (a, b)&A (c, d)&o'(b, d) < e). 
Considering that A(a, b) is b-yta ,  this says cr(ta, tc)< e, the desired result. This 
completes the proof. 
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Remark. The hypothesis VaEX3!b  E Y cannot in general be weakened to 
Va~X: ib  ~ Y, as the examples given at the beginning of Section 2.1 to motivate 
the principle of local continuity show. 
2.5. Kiinig's rule and He ine-Borers  rule 
K6nig's lemma, in its classical form, asserts that an infinite binary tree has an 
infinite path. Constructively, we might consider the version, if every path is finite 
then the tree is finite. Since we do not have full comprehension, it is stronger to 
consider a schema. And finally, we are actually more interested in the nodes which 
are not in the tree than the ones which are. We therefore take K6nig's lemma and 
the corresponding rule in the form given below. First we review some notation: if 
f E 2 N, then f (n )  is the finite sequence of length n (f(0) . . . .  , f (n  - 1)); for sequence 
numbers and t, s _C t means that lh(s) ~ lh(t) and (s), = (t), for i ~< lh(s). (We used 
the same symbol with a different meaning in Section 1.2.) Here is our version of 
K6nig's rule: 
(KR): from R(s )&s  C_ t ~ R(t)  and VfE2NrlnR([(n))  infer, for some k, Vf 
2 N R (f(k-)). 
KR is interesting in its own right, but is also intimately connected with questions 
of uniform continuit31, as we shall see. 
Theorem 2.5.1. EM and other theories are closed under K6nig's rule. 
Proof. Suppose EM proves the hypotheses of K6nig's rule. Form the theory EMa 
based on the metric space 2 N. We have that EMa F 3n R(a(n)); hence, by explicit 
definability for EMa, for some term t of EMa we have EMa F t ~ N&R (a(t)). Let k 
be the integer produced in the corollary to Theorem 1.8.2 such that EMa F t ~</~. 
Then EMa F a(t )C a(k), and so, using the other part of the hypothesis of the rule, 
EMa F R (r~(k)). Hence, EM F Vz E2 N R ($(/~), the desired conclusion. This com- 
pletes the proof for EM. Note that the corollary to Theorem 1.8.2 follows from 
condition (iii) in general, so that our arguments apply to any theories satisfying 
(i)-(iii). 
Next we will consider the rule corresponding to (one version of) Heine-Borel 's 
theorem. Heine-Borel 's theorem cannot be proved in EM (as we shall see in 
another section), and there is no reason to believe it constructive - -  for given a 
sequence of intervals I, covering, say, [0,1], how can one produce a finite 
subcover? Intuition says that the proof that the I, 's are a cover should carry enough 
information to provide a finite subcover, but we know too little about possible 
constructive proofs to verify this. (Although Brouwer made philosophical efforts to 
justify it.) Nevertheless, we do know enough about formal proofs to show that a 
formal proof that L, is a cover carries enough information to produce a finite 
subcover. 
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Let X be a (provably) compact space, and suppose that I is provably an 
operation whose domain includes N such that for n in N, I. is an open sphere in X. 
Then Heine-Borel's rule is 
HBR (X, I) from X C (..J I,, 
t IEN 
infer, for some k, XC U L. 
n,siff 
(The meaning of union in EM was explained in Section 0.1.) 
Theorem 2.5.2. EM and other theories are closed under Heine-Borel's rule. 
Proof. Form the theory EMa based on 2(. Suppose EM proves the hypothesis of 
the rule. Then EMa F =! n(a E I,  & n E N). By Theorem 1.4.2 (explicit definability for 
EMa), there is a closed term t of EMa such that EMa F t E N&a E/, .  Let k be an 
integer as in Theorem 1.3.3, such that EMa F t ~</~. Then EMa F a E U,,~L,. Hence 
EM FVa~X(a  E U,,,~I,) ,  the desired conclusion. 
2.6. Continuity of provably extensional functions 
The question whether all functions from, say, the reals to the reals, which can be 
constructively defined, are necessarily continuous, is a basic question in the 
foundations of constructive mathematics. It may be that every proof that a function 
jr is well-defined and extensional on the reals must also carry along enough 
information to provide a modulus of continuity for fi This is certainly the case for all 
known f, and as we shall see in this section, it is true generally for functions which 
can be proved in EM to be well-defined and extensional; that is, while we can't say 
anything about all possible constructive proofs, at least every formal proof in EM 
that f is a function carries along a modulus of continuity. 
Let X be a (provably) complete separable metric space; let Y be a (provably) 
separable metric space; let EXT(X, 
to Y, that is f E EXT(X, Y) if[ 
fE  Y• &Vx, yEX(x -xy  
Y) be the set of extensional operations from X 
--~ f(x )~yf (y  )). 
For f, g in EXT(X, Y), we say f - g iff Vx, y EX(x  ~ y ---~f(x) ~ g(y)). We say B is 
extensional on EXT(X, Y) iff f ~ g &B(f)---~B(g). Let B be a (provably) exten- 
sional property on EXT(X, Y). 
Theorem 2.6. If T F 3 fEEXT(X ,  Y )B  (f), then T ~- 3 fE  C(X, Y )B  (f). In particu- 
lar, if the predicate B serves to define f in EM, then f is uniformly continuous on 
compact subsets. Here T is EM, EMN, or other theories mentioned at the beginning of 
Section 2. 
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Proof. Suppose EMF3fEEXT(X ,  Y)B(f). Then, by Theorem 1.4.2, there is a 
closed term t of EM such that EMFtEEXT(X ,Y )&B( f ) .  Hence, 
EMFVa~X=I!b~ Yb-eta .  Further, EM proves that the predicate b-vta  is 
extensional, since t is provably in EXT(X, Y). Hence the rule of continuous choice 
(Theorem 2.4) applies, and we get 
EM F 3rE C(X, Y)Va ~X (f(a)-  vta). 
Hence EM F 3rE C(X, Y ) f  ~ t. Since EM F B (t) and B is provably extensional, we 
have EM F 3rE C(X, Y)B (f). This completes the proof for EM. 
As we shall see in the next section, this rule (like the ones considered in previous 
sections) will not hold if Church's thesis CT is added to the systems. However, it 
may be that provably extensional functions are provably continuous (but not 
necessarily uniformly continuous) when Church's thesis is present. This result is 
proved for arithmetic of finite types in [3]; it depends on closure under (a variant of) 
Markov's rule. The corresponding result for Feferman's systems has been proved 
for the weakest system, based on comprehension only (but not here). It remains 
open for EM. 
We can apply the above theorem to solve a problem of Bishop. Bishop asks [8, p. 
151] whether, given a function f in C([0, 1], R) such that Vx E[0, l ] f (x)  > 0, one 
can conclude inf f(x) > 0. The answer is, that if the hypothesis on f can be proved in 
EM or EMN, then the conclusion can also be proved in EM or EMN; the 
corresponding implication is consistent with EMC § but inconsistent with Church's 
thesis. The derived rule belongs in this section, the inconsistency with Church's 
thesis in the next section, and the consistency will not be explicitly mentioned, but 
follows from the consistency of C(X, Y)= EXT(X, Y) by essentially the same 
proof as for the derived rule. To establish the derived rule, observe that if f(x) > 0 
for all x, then the function g (x) = l / f  (x) is defined and extensional; hence, applying 
Theorem 2.6, can be proved to be uniformly continuous, hence bounded. Hence f is 
bounded below. 
2.7. Church's thesis and continuity rules 
By Church's thesis we mean the assertion that all (total) operations from N to N 
are recursive: 
CT,: VfENN3eVx EN3n(T(e ,x ,n)&Un =]'(x)), 
where T is (a formalization of) Kleene's T-predicate. We call this CT~ to distinguish 
it from the schema in arithmetic usually known as CT, which follows from CTa and 
an axiom of choice; and to distinguish it from CT2 which makes an assertion about 
partial functions. 
Theorem 2.7. No consistent extension of EMN + CT1 is closed under any of the 
rules considered so far, in particular under LC(R,N), CC(R,R) ;  Kiinig's rule; 
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Heine-Borel' s rule ; the rule, from pointwise convergence infer uniform convergence ; 
and the rule, from V xf ( x ) > 0 infer 3 e > 0 V x f(x ) > e discussed in the last section. 
Proof. We first discuss the general situation. For each of the rules in question, 
there is an instance, from A infer B, such that A is provable in EMN + CT, and B 
is refutable in EMN + CT,. This yields not only the statement of the theorem, but 
also the fact that EMN + CT1 refutes the principle corresponding to the rule (which 
will be explicitly stated in the next section). (Merely knowing that (A--->B) is 
refutable is not enough to prevent closure under the rule, from A infer B. For 
example, take B to be 0 = 1, and A to be an unprovable sentence whose double 
negation is provable.) 
We begin with K6nig's rule. It is well-known that (even in HA) there is a 
recursive binary tree which is well-founded with respect o recursive descending 
sequences but is still finite. (See [27] for a proof with classical logic.) If R defines the 
set of finite sequences of O's and l 's not in the tree, then 
EMN + CT, I- VfE2 N 3nR(f(n)) ,  
m 
but EMN + CT, F---~VfE2NR ( f (k))  for each k. This takes care of K6nig's rule. 
Take X to be the space 2 N, and consider the collection of neighborhoods L,
determined by sequences s such that R (s) but for no proper initial segment  of s 
do we have R (t), we see that 
EMN + CT, F- Vf~2NBnf~I,, ,  
but for each k, 
EMN+ CT, I- ~ Vf~2N3n ~Fcf E I,,. 
This takes care of Heine-Borel's rule. 
Lacombe constructed a similar cover for the recursive reals in [22]; in [2] this 
construction was constructivized and modified to yield a covering In of the recursive 
reals in [0,1] such that each x E [0, I] is in some In, and is not in any I, with 
n > F(x), for some recursive operation F, and yet the total length of the intervals is 
less than, say, 89 These facts are provable in HA, and so in EMN. When CT1 is 
added to EMN, they become statements about all reals, not just recursive reals. 
Hence consistent extensions of EMN + CT~ are not closed under Heine-Borel's 
rule even for [0, 1]. 
This same pathological covering can be used to take care of the pointwise 
convergence rule. Let fn be a "spike function" of height 1 which is zero outside In. 
Then the f, converge pointwise to zero (provably in EMN + CT~), by the property 
of the operation F mentioned above. But EMN+CTI  refutes the uniform 
convergence of the f,, since sup(f~ ) = 1. 
Next note that EMN + CT, proves the existence of .a particular function from 
[0, 1] to R which is continuous, but unbounded (so not uniformly continuous). This 
construction is due (in the recursive case, with classical ogic) to Lacombe [22], and 
308 M.J. Beeson 
is constructivized in [2]. (It is an easy consequence of the covering discussed above.) 
A slight modification of the construction i [2], which we leave to the reader, shows 
that we may take such a function H to be unbounded not only on [0, 1] but also on 
every subinterval. Thus EMN + CT~ I- Vx E[0, 1] BnH(x) <~ n, but (considering this 
as the hypothesis of LC([0,1],N), EMN+CTI  refutes the conclusion of 
LC([0, 1], N), i.e., 
EMN + CT~ F --n (3n3~ > OVx!x - 89 < 8 --~ H(x)  <~ n). 
This takes care of LC ([0, 1], N). If we insist on getting the result for LC(R,  N), it can 
be done as follows: let P(x, n) be the predicate used above, namely H(x ) <~ n. Then 
EMN +CT~ FVx E R ::In ~ N(x <4 Iv x >~v P(x, n)), 
but the corresponding conclusion of LC(R, N) can be refuted as above. 
The same example takes care of the rule of continuous choice. For 
EMN + CT~ I- Vx E[0, 1] 3!y y -R  H(x), 
yet EMN + CT, refutes that H is uniformly continuous. 
Finally, to deal with the rule, from Vx E[0, 1]f(x)  > 0 infer 
::le>OVxE[O, 1] f (x)>e,  we construct, using C%, an example of a function g 
which is positive for all x, but whose infimum is zero. The idea is to take 
g(x) = 1/(1 + F(x)) where F is the function of [2] which is defined on all recursive 
reals but unbounded. Since F is nonnegative, we have g(x )>0,  and since F is 
unbounded, we have inf g(x) = 0. The only problem is to insure that g is uniformly 
continuous; this requires a careful look at the construction of F; however, by the 
time one does this, one might as well construct g directly from the pathological 
covering. Roughly, one has to be careful that the spikes which are summed to get F 
have their slopes bounded in terms of their heights. To see what is involved, assume 
F is ditterentiable (which can be arranged by rounding off the corners of  the spike 
functions which make up F) and write out the formula for the derivative of g, which 
we then have to show is bounded. Details are left to the reader. 
Remark. From one point of view, the results of this section show the difficulties in 
getting recursive analysis to look like classical analysis. From another, they show 
that EM can be used to generalize both recursive analysis and (a part of) classical 
analysis. 
2.8. Local continuity with parameters 
In the applications, one finds that one wishes to consider a metric space X for use 
in the principle of local continuity, where X depends on a parameter  e. For 
instance, in [4], we have occasion to consider a space depending on a sequence of 
Jordan curves F,. This leads to the question, suppose a theory T proves Q(e) -~ X 
is a complete separable metric space, and Y is separable, and f maps S into Y; 
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then can we conclude that T proves O(e)---~f is continuous? And of course we can 
raise similar questions for local continuity, local uniform continuity, etc. To be 
more precise, the rule of local continuity with a parameter from Q, for the case 
Y = N, can be stated as follows: if I- (Q(e)~X,  is a complete separable metric 
space), and F (Q(e)---~P is extensional), and I- Q(e)---~Va~X,3nP(a,n),  then 
F Q(e)---~VaEX,3n::t~Vb E N8 (a)P(b, n). 
One can state LC +(X, Y) with a parameter from Q similarly. 
We shall treat the case in which Q is (provably) a subset of N N. (This is quite 
general, as will be seen in examples, below.) We also assume that Q is "self- 
realizing" in the sense of Section 1.6. This is no restriction in practice; for example, 
it just means we should take as a parameter, a continuous function together with its 
modulus of continuity, instead of just the function itself. 
Theorem 2.8. Let Q be as described. Then EM and other theories are closed under 
the rule of local continuity with a parameter f om Q. 
Remark. Because of the requirement that Q be "self-realizing", we here deviate 
from the plan of deriving all our rules from the general conditions (i)-(iii). 
However,  the concept of "self-realizing" applies to all known formal systems, so 
the present result is also quite general. 
Proof. Fix a formal theory T, say in Feferman's language for concreteness. Let 
A(e)  denote the hypothesis of "local continuity" and B(e) the conclusion. (The 
parameter enters both in determining the space X and in the property P, maybe.) 
So we want to show 
T F (Q(e)--* A (e)) implies T ~- (Q(e)--* B(e)). 
If e is a fixed member of (the set denoted by) Q, then T" is a theory like the one 
called Tb before, i.e. T plus a constant e plus all e(~)= rfi for n,m such that 
e(n) = m, plus an axiom Q(e). For each fixed n, TT, is formed in this way from the 
theory T ,  (T restricted to complexity ~< n). 
Now T ~ satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) for each fixed e such that Q(e);  moreover, for 
each fixed n, T proves that TT, satisfies (i)-(iii). This is easy to check by methods that 
were applied before to To ; the only new twist is that we must use the fact that Q is 
self-realizing to check that the axiom Q(e) is realized. (When we say "each fixed 
n",  we mean "each sufficiently large fixed n";  it has to be large enough, for 
instance, that the self-realizing property of Q is provable in T,,.) In particular, we 
have the reflection principle in the form, 
T F ((Q(e)---~ Pr~ (A (e)))& Q(e)---~ A (e)). 
It follows that T proves (e E NN--~ T~ - satisfies local continuity) for each fixed n; 
more precisely, 
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T k e ~ Nr~&Pr~ (A (e))--~ Pr~B (e)) (fixed n). (1) 
Now suppose TkO(e)--~A(e); we want Tk O(e)---~B(e). Fix n so that 
T, k O(e)--*A(e). (2) 
Argue in T as follows: Fix e so that O(e); form Ten; by (1), we have (since 
T. k O _C N N) 
T,", k A (e) implies T~ k B (e). (3) 
By (2), we have T,",kA(e); hence by (3), T~kB(e). 
Applying the reflection principle for T;, we get (still in T) that B (e) is true. Thus 
we have proved T k Q(e)----~B(e), completing the proof of the theorem. 
Example 1. If O is a complete separable metric space, then bringing it to 
"standard form" (Section 2) we see that it can be regarded as a subset of N N. 
Example 2. Suppose O(e) says e is a sequence of Jordan curves. To make it 
self-realizing, we should instead consider the O that says e is a sequence of 
functions F, from the circle S 1 to R 3, together with moduli of continuity, inverse 
functions F~ I, and moduli of continuity for the inverses. Since C(St, R 3) is a 
complete metric space, it is possible to regard each member of it as a function from 
N to N (e.g. as a sequence of approximating polynomials with rational coefficients); 
so a sequence of such functions is also a function from N to N, using a pairing 
function. (The condition that FF-I(x) = x =F-ZF(x) is self-realizing, since it 
contains no existential quantifies and only integer variables.) Hence this example is 
covered by the theorem. 
Remark. The results of this section were not included in the first drafts of this 
paper. Troelstra called attention to the omission, and this section was then written 
but not before [34] went to the printers with the statement that local contiriuity 
with parameters was not treated. 
3. CONSISTENCY AND INDEPENDENCE RESULTS 
Corresponding to each of the rul.es considered in Section 2 there is an axiom 
schema, obtained by placing an implication sign between the hypothesis and 
conclusion of the rule. Note that these rules have the conditions on X, Y, and the 
property P as part of the hypothesis, so that these conditions appear in the 
corresponding axiom schemata. Thus we have 
LC(X, Y): principle of local continuity, 
LUC(X, Y): principle of local uniform continuity, 
CC(X, Y): principle of continuous choice, 
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KL: K6nig's lemma (as a schema for properties P), 
HB: Heine-Borel's principle (for countable covers), 
EXT(X, Y)= C(X, Y): "All extensional functions are locally uniformly con- 
tinuous", 
EXT(X, Y): Cont (X, Y) "All extensional functions are continuous", 
PC---* UC Pointwise convergence implies uniform convergence. 
By Markov's principle we mean 
MP VrnEN(- 'nVnEN-nAnm ----~3nENAnrn) (A recursive). 
In the following sections we settle the main questions of logical interdependence 
between these principles, relative to EMN and EMC § (as weak and strong ends of 
the spectrum) and Church's thesis. Actually the results continue to hold if the 
schema of TI on all primitive recursive well-orderings i added, but we do not 
emphasize this. 
3.1. Some easy results 
In this section we give those results which can be obtained by adaptations of 
methods used for arithmetic and arithmetic of finite types, or by simple direct 
arguments. 
Theorem 3.1.1. (i) EMC § + CT2 + MP and EMC + + --1CT1 + MP are consistent, 
(ii) EMN + CT2 + MP F EXT(X, Y) = Cont (X, Y), 
(iii) EMN + CT~ refutes EXT(I, N) = C(I, N), K6nig's lemma KL, Heine -Borel, 
LC(I,N), and PC--~UC (here I is [0,1]), 
(iv) EMN + LUC(X, Y) + AC+F CC(X, Y)& (PC---~ UC), 
(v) EMN + CC (X, Y)F EXT(X, Y)= C (X, V), 
(vi) EMN + LC(X,N) F LC(X, Y), 
(viii) EMN + LUC(X,N) I- LUC(X, Y). 
Proof. Ad (i) The consistency of EM +-'1CT1 + MP follows from the fact that 
these are classically true. The consistency of EMC§  follows from 
1945-realizability (Section 0.3). To get the consistency of EMC § + ---1 CT1 + MP, we 
use 1945-realizability n a model based on functions recursive in some non-recursive 
set. 
Ad (ii) Under CT2, the assertion EXT(X, Y) = Cont (X, Y) becomes aversion of 
Kreisel-Lacombe-Shoenfield's theorem KLS [19]. We say "a version of" because 
the form of Cont requires not only that all effective operations from X to Y be 
continuous, but that they have recursive modulus of continuity. However, this 
strong version of KLS does indeed follow from MP in arithmetic, as was checked 
for X = N N in [1]. The reader may check it himself (or herself) for general complete 
separable X. 
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Ad (iii) This has been proved already in Section 2.7. 
Ad (iv) Like Theorems 2.4 and 2.3; for (PC--* UC), only ACr~ is needed. 
Ad (v) Suppose f E EXT(X, Y). Then VaEX3b E Yf(a)  = b. Apply CC(X, Y): 
then 3hEC(X ,  Y )Va~Xh(a)=f (a ) .  Hence fE  C(X, Y). To be technically 
precise, actually h is a pair consisting of a function and a modulus of continuity; and 
it is not f that belongs to C(X, Y), but f supplemented by the modulus of 
continuity of h. 
Ad (vi) and (vii) Like the proof of Lemma 2.1. 
We briefly consider two more principles from classical analysis, in addition to 
Heine-Borel.  These are the intermediate value theorem 
(IVT) V[~C(I ,  R)(~(0) = l& f (1 )  = - 1---~ 3xE I f (x  ) = O) 
and the theorem of the maximum: 
(MAX) V f~ C( I ,R )3x  ~ I Vz ~ I f (x )~f (z ) .  
Both of these, like Heine-Borel, are inconsistent with Church's thesis; indeed, 
EMN + ACN proves that either one of them implies there is an f in N N which 
separates two recursively inseparable r.e. sets. We shall see below, however, that 
Heine-Borel  is consistent with the principle of local continuity. This raises the 
question whether the same is true of IVT and MAX - -  the answer is no: IVT and 
MAX are in some sense much less constructive than Heine-Borel.  (In fact Brouwer 
worked hard to justify Heine-Borel constructively.) 
Theorem 3.1.2. LC + IVT + EMN and LC + MAX + EMN are inconsistent. 
Proof. Suppose IVT and LC. Then let f be a function from I to R which is zero 
from 1/3 to 2/3 and linear on the two intervals [0,1/3] and [2/3,1]. By 
LC (C(/, R),  I),  there is an x in I which is a zero of f, and such that any sufficiently 
nearby function g has a zero within say 1/8 of x. This is absurd, since some 
arbitrarily nearby g's have their only zero > 2/3 while others have their only zero 
< 1/3. A similar argument works for MAX, considering instead of f a function 
which is 0 at 0 and 1, and is identically 1 on the middle third, and linear on the two 
end thirds. 
3.2. Consistency of local continuity 
In this section we establish the consistency of EM + LC(X, Y). We already have 
seen that LC(R,N)  is inconsistent with Church's thesis; and since it is classically 
false, a consistency proof is called for. Nor is closure under the corresponding 
derived rule any help (see the example in the pro6f of Theorem 2.7). The most 
natural approach to a consistency proof for LC (X, Y) is realizability. However,  we 
cannot use a recursive realizability, since LC(X, Y) is inconsistent with Church's 
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thesis. In place of recursive realizability, we will use realizability in the model 
constructed in Section 2, in which every operation from N ,~ to N is continuous. 
Theorem 3.2. EM + CA + ACT+ LC(X, Y) is consistent. 
Proof. We use 1945-realizability in the model 24 of Section 1.2. Except for 
realizing CA, we could use the 1945-realizability of Section 0.3; but in order to get 
CA realized, we have to use 1945-realizability with the X* trick (see Section 1.6). 
Actually, for all the statements we are going to consider in this and the next section, 
it doesn't matter if we use realizability with or without the X* trick, because the 
only possible bound classification variables occur hidden in the formulae P 
involved in the schemata. Also, formulae like x ~ N N are true iff they are realized, 
by Theorem 1.6.4 for realizability with the X* trick, and by Lemma 1.4.1 for 
realizability without the X* trick. We shall use this fact implicitly. 
We are going to show that if A is any instance of LC(X, Y), then At ~ 3 u u rA. 
Hence A is consistent with EM, as follows: by the soundness of 1945-realizability, if 
EMC+I---nA, then EM~-t r~A for some term t. Hence, by Theorem 1.2.1, 
d4 ~ t r '~A.  Hence, if 24 ~-3uurA,  then 24 ~3wwrO= 1, i.e., d,t ~0 = 1, which 
is absurd. 
We shall not refer to the details of the construction of ~,  but only to the property 
stated in Theorem 1.2.1. In particular, we identify the integers N of 24 with the true 
integers N from now on. 
We now show each instance A of LC(X,N) is realized in d~. (By Theorem 
3.1.1 (vi), this suffices). Thus A has the form "X complete separable" & "P  
extensional" &
V a ~ X 3k E N P(a,k )---~ V a ~ X 38 >03m ~Ngb ~ X (p(a,b ) < 8--~ P(b,m )). 
The essential part of getting this i:ealized is to produce from realizers of the 
hypothesis, an operation f in 24 such that for a EX  (which is the same as a 
realized to be in X), f (a)  is 8 such that the conclusion is realized. Now a realizer of 
the hypothesis will provide an operation h such that for a in X, h(a) is k such that 
P(a, k) is realized. Since X _C N N is true in At (being realized), f (d)  can be taken to 
be a modulus of continuity for h, which exists by Theorem 1.2.1. The integer m on 
the right can be produced by h itself. Then, if p(a, b) < 8 is realized (and so, true) 
in At, by Lemma 0.2 we can find d with b-xd  and d having an initial segment of 
values agreeing with a ; in fact, a long enough initial segment so that h (d) = h (a) = 
m. Thus P(d, m) is realized. We want to conclude that P(b, m) is realized. For this 
we need to know that the predicate 3uurP(x, k) is satisfied in 24 to be extensional. 
We know that "P  extensional" is realized in 24, which is not quite the same, but 
close enough: to prove 3uurP(x, k) is extensional in 24, let x -y  and suppose 
urP(x,k).  Then x-y  is realized, and since "P  extensional" is realized, 
3 v v r P(y, k), which shows that the predicate 3u u r P(x, k) is extensional in At. This 
completes the proof. 
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3.3. K6nig's lemma and local uniform continuity 
Our aim in this section is to derive, roughly speaking, the simultaneous 
consistency of EM with every principle considered in this paper except Church's 
thesis. We begin with some results on K6nig's lemma. 
The form of KSnig's lemma we have given as KL applies to paths in 2 N, i.e., the 
binary tree; but another form applies to trees with finitary (but no binary) 
branching. More precisely, let " f  ~ 2 '~'' in KL be replaced by Vnf(n) <- M(n), and 
preface the statement by VMENN; the resulting schema is called "K6nig's lemma 
with finitary branching". We need to show the two forms are equivalent in EMN. 
Let T be the full tree of all finite sequences of integers, and let Q be the binary 
tree of all sequences of O's and l's. Both are partially ordered by the relation s C t 
("s is an initial segment of t"). 
Lemma 3.3.1. There is a (.primitive recursive) map from Q onto T, such that s C t 
ill H(s) c_ H(t). 
Proof. Each sequence of O's and l's can be written in the form 
s = (0% 1"~+1, 0 x~§ lX"§ aX-§ 
where a is either 0 or 1, 1 x, abbreviates a list of x, l's, and each x~ >~0. Let 
H(s) = (xl, x2 .... , x,-~): Note that H(s) ends with x,-l, not x,. This means that H 
will not be one-to-one, but it will satisfy H(s) C H(t) iff s _C t. 
Lemma 3.3.2. K6nig's lemma with finitary branching is derivable in EMN + KL, 
Proof. Suppose Vf(Vnf(n) C_ M(n)---~ 3nR(f(n))) and s C_ t &R (s)---* R(t). We 
wish to conclude ::l m Vf (V nf(n) C M(n)--~ R (f(m))). We construct apredicate R * 
of finite sequences of O's and l 's from R by means of the map H of the previous 
lemma, and apply KL to R *. Take R*(s)  to be 
R(H(s)) v 3k < lh(H(s))(H(s))k > M(k )). 
Then s C_ t&R*(s)---~ R*(t), since s C_ t--~ H(s)C_H(t). We claim 
2 3nR*(f(n)). (*) 
To see this, let f E2r~; compute successively H(7(n)) for n = 1 ,2 , . . . .  This 
generates initial segments of a function g in N N, since H preserves order. If either 
g(k) > M(k)  or R (g(k)) for some k, then 3nR*(f(n)). However, without using 
Markov's principle, we can't directly show that one of these must hold. Thus 
instead of g we work with the function h, which is defined by 
h(k )={;  (k) ifg(k)<~M(k)'otherwise. 
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Thus, by hypothesis, for some n, R(h(n)). Now either g(k)>M(k) for some 
k ~ n, or else R(~,(n)). Hence 3nR*(f(n)), proving (*). 
Now apply KL to (*) to conclude 3kVfE 2NR*([(k)). We claim 
v/(v n/(,q Mo --, R ([(k))). 
To prove this, let f satisfy f(n)~< M(n). Let g be such that H carries initial 
segments of g into initial segments of .f. Then R *(~(k)); and in fact R *(~(k)) holds 
because R (H(g(k))) (not because of the second clause in the definition of R*); 
since f(n)<~M(n). But H(g(k) )= f (m) for some m ~< k, since H carries initial 
segments of g into initial segments of f, and doesn't increase length. 
Hence R(f(m)). Hence R(f(k)). This proves the lemma. 
Theorem 3.3.1. (i) EMN + KL+ LC(X, Y) proves LUC(X, Y) 
(ii) EMN + LUC(X, Y)+ AC~ proves EXT(X, Y) = C(X, Y) 
(iii) EMN + LUC(X, Y) proves Heine-Borel (HB). 
Proof. Ad (i) Argue as follows in EMN+KL+LC.  It suffices to prove 
LUC (X, N). Suppose Va~X3n ~ NP(a, n), where X is compact metric space. Fix 
a E X. Then, by LC(X,N), we can find k and m such that if N(a) is the 
neighborhood of a of radius 1/k, then 'v'c ~N(a) P (c, m ). We need to find an upper 
bound on k independent of a. 
By Section 0.2, X may be assumed to be in "standard form for compact spaces"; 
i.e., X is the set of all x in N N such that X, ~< M,, for some constructive sequence 
M,, equipped with a suitable metric. Let N(t) be the set of x ~ X with initial 
segment ; then N(t) has diameter bounded below in terms of lh(t). That is, any x 
within 1/lh(t) of x, (defined in Section 2) will be in N(t). (We don't say there are 
points in N(t) this far apart.) Now define R(t) to be the predicate 3mVc 
N(t) P(c, m). Since t _C s ~ N(t) D N(s), we have t C s &-R (t)--~ R (s). Also, we 
have Va~X3mR(gi(m)), since if we take m large enough, N(~(m)) will be 
contained in the neighborhood N(a) which exists by LC(X,N). Now we can apply 
K6nig's lemma with finitary branching (which follows from KL by the preceding 
lemma) to obtain 3mVaR(g~(m)). In view of the fact noted above that there is a 
lower bound on the diameter N(t) in terms of lh(t), we have obtained the required 
lower bound on the diameters of the N(a) involved in the principle of local 
continuity. This completes the proof of (i). 
Ad (ii) Argue in EMN as follows: Suppose LUC(X, Y) and f~EXT(X ,Y ) .  
Then VaEX3b E Yf(a)~vb. Since f is extensional, we can apply LUC(X, Y) to 
obtain 
Ve >O38 >OVa E X ::tb E YVe ~N~(a)3d E Y(d-v f (c )  & cr(b,d)<e), 
which is just 
Ve >0 38>0 V a EXVc @ N8 (a )(o'(f(a),f(c ))< z). 
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Applying AC~, we can find 8 as a function of e (since e is rational only ACN is 
needed); thus f ~ C(X, Y). This completes the proof of (ii). 
Ad (iii) Suppose that the neighborhoods/ ,  form a cover of the compact space X. 
Then Va~X~na ~ I,. Apply LUC(X,N);  we obtain for each a in X, a neighbor- 
hood N(a) of radius at least 8 (for some 8 > 0) such that N(a) is entirely contained 
in some I~. Let x~,..., x, be a finite set of points of X such that every point is within 
of some x~. Then the N(x~) form a finite subcover. This completes the proof. 
Theorem 3.3.2. The following are simultaneously consistent with EM: 
(i) The principles of local continuity, LC(X, Y) and LC § (X, Y), 
(ii) Local uniform continuity LUC(X,Y) ,  CC(X, Y), PC--*UC, 
Heine-Borel, 
(iii) K6nig's lemma KL, 
(iv) ZXT(X, Y)= C(X, V), 
(v) Markov's principle MP, 
(vi) The axiom of choice ACt-r, 
(vii) The elementary comprehension axiom CA. 
and 
Proof. By realizability (with the X* trick) in the model of Theorem 1.2.2. By 
Theorem 3 LC(X, Y) is realized. ACFr is realized; the argument for this is similar to 
that for q-realizability in Section 1.6. Hence, by Lemma 2.1.2, LC+(X, Y)  is 
realized. MP is realized just as it is in arithmetic. By Theorem 3.3.2, it then suffices 
to show Kfnig's lemma is realized. Recall that K6nig's lemma is 
KL: sC_t&R(s)---~R(t) 
& VfE2~3n ENR (f(n))---~ 3m ENVf~2~ R (f(m )). 
In the presence of ACPr, KL follows from "every operation from 2 r~ to N is 
bounded",  or more precisely, 
Vg~N2~3m ENVfE2~ g(f) <~ m. (*) 
To see the equivalence, use ACrr to write 
Vf~2"3n~NR(f(n))  as 3g~N2NVn@Nn(f(g(f))). 
Thus it suffice~ to show (*) is realized in A,L Since, by Theorem 1.6.5, statements 
like " f  E 2 N'' are true if and only if they are realized, this boils down to producing m 
from g by means of an operation in .A~. According to Theorem 1.2.1, for each g in 
N 2N in A4, there is an operation O in A~ such that O(s)= 0 or 0(s) = g(f)+ 1 for all f 
with initial segment s, and furthermore this 0 can be obtained from g by an 
operation in At. It therefore suffices to show that we can pass from ~ to the bound m 
by means of an operation in At. Associated with 0 is the set S of sequence numbers 
s* (n) such that 0(s) = 0 but O(s*(n)) > 0. This set is enumerable by an operation in 
At. It consists of a set of pairwise incomparable sequence numbers. Now, one can 
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tell recursively (and hence by an operation in ~t) whether or not a finite set of 
pairwise incomparable sequence numbers blocks all paths in 2 N (for instance by 
computing the measure of the associated neighborhoods). To compute m from 0, 
proceed as follows: enumerate the set S until the members o far enumerated block 
all paths in 2 s. Then m = max (0(s)) over s in S. In Order to see that m is defined, in 
other words that at some stage in the enumeration of S all paths are blocked, we 
use Kdnig's lemma, which holds in rid, by Theorem 1.2.2. This completes the proof. 
Theorem 3.3. EM+ LC(X, Y) does not imply KL, LUC(X, Y), or any of the 
consequences of LidC(X, Y) mentioned in Theorem 3.3.2 (ii); even with the aid of 
ACre- and Markov's principle. 
Proof. By realizability in the model X of Theorem 1.2.2. By Theorem 3.2.1, which. 
applies to both models of Theorem 1.2.2, we have that LC(X, Y) is realized in N. 
Hence  it suffices to show that the various statements asserted to be underivable are 
not realized in N. The idea is that although CT1 is not realized in N, the recursive 
counterexamples di cussed in Section 2.7 can still be used. The reason for this is as 
follows: Church's thesis fails in N not because there are non-recursive functions, 
but because an index of [ cannot be produced from any initial segment of f. 
However,  the counterexamples of Section 2.7 depend on the existence of pathologi- 
cal covers, which are of continuous construction. Let In be the pathological cover of 
the recursive reals in [0, 1]. By simply computing the real x to higher and higher 
degrees of accuracy, and examinimg more and more intervals I,, we will eventually 
satisfy ourselves that f E L, for some n. That is, there is an operation F in N such 
that for all x in [0, 1] ~, F(x) is defined and is an integer n such that x ~ I, holds in 
N. This depends on the fact that each such x is actually recursive. F can easily be 
used to show that Vf~[0, 1]=In ~N] ' ~ L, is realized in .A c. Since the existence of this 
cover implies the existence of counterexamples to PC~ UC, Heine-Borel, and 
CC; and hence (by Theorem 3.3.1) to LUC(X, Y), provably in EM + ACrr, none of 
these are derivable in EM + LC(X, Y)+ MP + AC § Since LC(X, Y) is realized in 
N, and KL implies LUC(X, Y) in EM + LC(X, Y), KL cannot be derivable in 
EM + LC(X, Y) + AC + + MP, either. This completes the proof. 
Remark.  The theorems of this section and the preceding do not immediately 
extend if full definition by cases and decidable quality is added to EM, since the 
models of Section 1.2 no longer apply. We can obtain the consistency of LC(X, Y) 
and LUC(X, Y) in this case for a wide class of properties P, sufficient o include 
those properties occurring in Bishop's book, by a completely different method. 
Since this result is somewhat angential we content ourselves with the following 
description of its proof: we use realizability in a mode/constructed from a BRFT 
(not only a weak BRFT) found as follows: take a countable transitive model of set 
theory. The total functions from N to N in this model form a class of functions 
closed under "recursive in", and hence are the total functions in some BRFT, by 
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[13]. For instance, K6nig's Iemma will hold in this model, since it is provable in set 
theory and its truth depends only on total functions (one for the tree and one for the 
path). Also, all extensional functions will be continuous, because the proof of 
Kreisel-Lacombe-Shoenfields' theorem extends to this BRFT. 
3.4. Independence of "All functions continuous" 
The question of the logical relationships between extensionality, continuity, and 
(local) uniform continuity of functions is fundamental in the foundations of 
constructive mathematics. It has already been shown, in Section 2.7, that no 
extension of EM consistent with CT1 proves that continuity implies uniform 
continuity, since under Church's thesis there is a continuous but not uniformly 
continuous function. The implication from extensionality o local uniform con- 
tinuity is then all the more unprovable, although as we have seen the corresponding 
derived rule is valid (if Church's thesis is not present). This leaves the question of 
the implication from extensionality o continuity. 
Theorem 3.4. EMC++CT2 does not prove EXT(X ,R)=Cont (X ,R)  (for any 
fixed complete separable X); not does it prove EXT(Nr~,N) = Cont(NN, N) or 
EXT(2 N, N) = Cont (N N, N). 
Remark. EM + CT2 does prove EXT(R,N)= Cont(R,N), so the theorem is the 
best possible. 
Proof. In the presence of CT2, the assertion EXT(X, R )= Cont (X, R) becomes 
equivalent o the assertion that every effective operation from X to R has a 
modulus of continuity. Let KLS(X ,R)  be the assertion that every effective 
operation from X to R is continuous; it suffices to show the unprovability of 
KLS(X,R).  Similarly for KLS(NN, N) and KLS(2N, N). In [1] it is shown that 
KLS(N N,N) and KLS(2N, N) are underivable in HA; and in [2] it is shown that 
KLS(R, R) is underivable in HA. The proof of [2] applies equally well to the case 
KLS(X, R), as soon as one formulates the theory of metric spaces in standard form 
as in Section 0.2. In [5] these results are extended to the intuitionistic theory of 
species HAS. As discussed in Lemma 1.i, there is an interpretation f EM + CA+ 
CT2 in HAS which preserves arithmetical formulae; since the versions of KLS 
under consideration are arithmetical, this proves that EM + CA + CT2 does not 
prove KLS, and hence does not prove the continuity statements under considera- 
tion. 
We still have to extend the independence to ACFr. Suppose ACrr+ EM+ CA+ 
CT21-EXT(X,R)= Cont(X,R). Then ACFT+EM+CA~-KLS(X,R), so EM+ 
CA f-pr KLS(X, R) for some p, but as discussed in [2], HA I-p r KLS---~ KLS, so 
EM + CA ~-KLS(X, R), contradicting [2]. This completes the proof. 
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Appendix: Historical notes 
In this appendix we make an attempt to place the present work in the context of 
previous work on continuity in intuitionism. 
The origin of interest in continuity on the part of intuitionists of course goes back 
to Brouwer, who introduced choice sequences todevelop atheory of the continuum 
and first stated the uniform continuity of functions on a closed interval (in 1927). A 
more detailed discussion of Brouwer's ideas on continuity, and the subsequent 
development of theories of choice sequences, can be found in Appendix A of [31]; 
we go no further into the matter here. 
Another, quite different, source of interest in continuity is in "recursive 
analysis". This subject lay at the heart of the Russian constructivist chool, and was 
also pursued in the West in the 1950s. It turned out that "effective operations" 
(functions operating recursively on indices of their arguments) are continuous. 
In Russia this is called Tseitin's theorem; in the West it is 
Kreisel-Lacombe-Shoenfield's theorem. (The priorities are clarified in a footnote 
to [1].) Of course, as discovered by Kleene [15, p. 683]) (and discussed in the 
present paper), uniform continuity fails in recursive analysis. 
The metamathematics of intuitionistie systems began with Heyting's formaliza- 
tions [14] (1930)). There was naturally an interest in the consistency of various 
axioms incompatible with classical ogic, and properties uch as the disjunction 
property and explicit definability. The first results on continuity and the fan 
theorem are in [16] (1957); in accomplished form, they are in Kleene-Vesley [35], 
published in 1965. The important ool of realizability by functions appears in [35], 
but for refinements one needs [17] (1969), where q-realizability appears. In this 
monograph, Kleene lists closure under Church's rule, the disjunction property, etc., 
for analysis, but not a continuity rule, although he could have easily obtained one 
with q-realizability. 
Kleene's method of function realizability, which yields the consistency of 
continuity principles with elementary analysis, bears a family resemblance to 
realizability in the particular system of partial functions with "continuous (partial) 
application", developed in the present paper. A fuller discussion is in the text. 
The underivability of uniform continuity follows from its failure in recursive 
analysis. The underivability of continuity in HA ~ follows from the fact that no 
modulus-of-continuity functional for extensional hereditarily recursively continu- 
ous functionals can itself be extensional ([21]). The underivability of continuity in 
the presence of Church's thesis requires the more subtle analysis in [1]. 
Cont!nuity and uniform continuity rules generally have an easier and a more 
difficult form: the easy form is "derivable implies true", and the difficult form is 
"derivable implies derivable". For continuity, the easier form for HA ~ (hence for 
analysis with function variables) is apparently not published, but probably was 
known to Kleene and Kreisel, who invented the notions (respectively) ofcountable 
functional ([18]) and hereditarily continuous functional ([20]). (It is easy to prove 
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the G6del functionals, which suffice to name the provable functionals of HA '~, are 
hereditarily continuous.) The more difficult derived rules appear in [29], especially 
in Section 2.7.8 and Section 3.7.9. 
Derived rules of uniform continuity appear not to have been published prior to 
1972. In that year [23] appeared (in Russian) containing (it now appears) a proof of 
the easier version "derivable implies true" of the uniform continuity rule ("fan 
rule") for the system EL + M of elementary analysis with Markov's principles. In 
[30] (due to an ambiguous English summary of [23]), Lifsic is given credit for the 
more difficult derived rule of uniform continuity, which is actually derived in [30]. 
The present paper was written without knowledge of [30] or [23]. In [30] it is 
pointed out that the rule can also be obtained by methods of [26]. 
The principle of local continuity appears here for the first time in its present 
form. It turns out, however, that an equivalent principle in topological language has 
previously been considered in [32]: "The interiors of the elements of a subcounta- 
ble covering of a complete separable metric space are again a covering". That is, 
X C (.J,~r V~, where I C_ N implies X _C I..J~e, Int (V~). In this paper (informally), and 
more axiomatically in [33, p. 73], this principle is derived from Va3x-continuity; 
hence it is consistent with elementary analysis. Similar methods can be used to get 
the rule of local continuity for elementary analysis. 
In [34], it is proved that continuity and uniform continuity are conservative for 
arithmetic theorems, when added to HA' .  The method is elimination of choice 
sequences. This result can also be proved using forcing as introduced in the present 
paper, and has the interesting consequence that Heine-Borel's theorem is conser- 
vative. 
Note 1 
It can be shown that CT~ does not imply CT2 in EM. To see this, use 
1945-realizability in the class of functions recursive in f, where f is a suitably chosen 
partial function. We shall choose f so that all total functions recursive in f are 
recursive, even though f is not partial recursive; and furthermore this is uniformly 
t rue- - there  is a recursive function G such that {e} f = {G(e)} whenever {e} r is 
total. The reader may use this result to carry out the realizability argument. To 
choose f, let A be any non-recursive subset of the recursively enumerable set 
{(n, m): {n}(m) defined}. Then let 
~'{n} (m) if (n ,m)~A,  
f((n, m ))= (undefined otherwise. 
Thus f is not partial recursive, since its domain is {(n, m) : {n} (m) is defined and in 
A} = A. Now, according to the definition of relative recursiveness in a partial 
function, if h is a further determination f g (i.e., h (x) = g (x) when g (x) is defined) 
then {e} h is a further determination of {e} s. Hence if {e} * is total, {e}" = {e} s. Let U 
be the universal function U((n, m }) = {n} (m). Thus U is a further determination of
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f. Hence if {e} r is total, {e} I = {e} u. But any function recursive in U is recursive, and 
uniformly so: that is, there is a recursive G such that {e} u = {G(e)}. Hence, if {e} I is 
total, {e} I = {e} u = {G(e)}. This completes the proof. 
This direct construction was suggested by the proof of Theorem 2.6.1 of [13]. The 
Corollary to Theorem 2.6.1 provides for the existence of f but not for the 
uniformity we require. 
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